Poll: MarketFolly Needs Your Feedback!

Hey everyone, help us make MarketFolly more enjoyable for you! We'd really appreciate it if you took a second of your time to vote in these 2 poll questions we've got setup. Feel free to write-in your own answers in "other" on the polls, write comments on this post, or email us. We would sincerely love hearing your suggestions, criticisms, etc. (RSS & Email readers: if you can't see the polls, please come to the blog to vote!)

The first question: What do you want to see more of on MarketFolly?



And, secondly, we're just checking in to see who our readers are. If you don't mind us asking anonymously, are you: a retail trader, a retail investor, a hedgie, a financial advisor/money manager, or institutional?



Thanks very much for all your help and please feel free to drop us comments or emails! We're always looking for ways to make MarketFolly better.

Passport Capital's Suggested Reading List

Recently, in an email to investors, John Burbank's $2 billion investment firm Passport Capital sent out a few links of suggested reading. If you're unfamiliar with Passport, their investment process "uses a combination of macroeconomic analyses to develop major themes and rigorous fundamental research on individual companies to create global portfolios" (as per their website). Since we here at Market Folly have Recommended Reading Lists (books) and "What We're Reading" posts (articles), we thought it would be interesting to post up what Passport is suggesting. Here are their recommendations, with the underlined titles as links to the original articles:

Current US Situation

Beyond the age of leverage: new banks must arise
Niall Ferguson, 2/03/09
"Two things must happen. First, banks that are de facto insolvent need to be restructured - a word that is preferable to the old-fashioned "nationalization". Existing shareholders will have to face that they have lost their money. Too bad; they should have kept a more vigilant eye on the people running their banks. Government will take control in return for a substantial recapitalisation after losses have meaningfully been written down. Bond-holders may have to accept either a debt-for-equity swap or a 20 per cent "haircut" (a reduction in the value of their bonds) - a disappointment, no doubt, but nothing compared with the losses when Lehman went under."

We can do better than a bad bank
George Soros, 2/04/09
"Although the amount needed to recapitalize the banks would be more than $1 trillion, it would be possible to mobilize a significant portion of the required total amount from the private sector. In the current environment, a good bank would enjoy exceptionally good margins. Margins would narrow as a result of competition, but by then the banking system would be revitalized and nationalization avoided."

Nationalized Banks Are "Only Answer," Economist Stiglitz Says
Interview with Joseph Stiglitz, 2/06/09
"I think many governments of emerging nations actually have a much better central banking system than the United States. They realized the risks of excessive leverage, excessive dependance on real estate lending and so they took much more prudent actions. Many developing countries also built up large reserves and are in a better position to meet this crisis than they were a decade ago."

IMF Outlines Dire Consequences if World Fails to Act on Banks
IMF Survey, 2/07/09
"The United States and Western Europe could learn from the previous experience of countries like Korea, Malaysia, Thailand, and also Sweden, which set up public resolution agencies, and often recovered a lot of public money. “Even with these measures, it will take time to restore credit growth. They will also be expensive for governments. But you know very well that the costs of banking crises increase if problems are not addressed quickly. This is not the time for hesitation," Strauss-Kahn said."

Why Obama’s new Tarp will fail to rescue the banks

Martin Wolf, 2/10/09

"The new plan seems to make sense if and only if the principal problem is illiquidity. Offering guarantees and buying some portion of the toxic assets, while limiting new capital injections to less than the $350bn left in the Tarp, cannot deal with the insolvency problem identified by informed observers. Indeed, any toxic asset purchase or guarantee programme must be an ineffective, inefficient and inequitable way to rescue inadequately capitalised financial institutions: ineffective, because the government must buy vast amounts of doubtful assets at excessive prices or provide over-generous guarantees, to render insolvent banks solvent; inefficient, because big capital injections or conversion of debt into equity are better ways to recapitalise banks; and inequitable, because big subsidies would go to failed institutions and private buyers of bad assets."

How Washington can prevent ‘zombie banks’

James Baker, 3/01/09

“This is not a call for nationalisation but rather for a temporary injection of public funds to clean up problem banks and return them to private ownership as soon as possible. As president Ronald Reagan’s secretary of the Treasury, I abhor the idea of government ownership – either partial or full – even if only temporary. Unfortunately, we may have no choice. But we must be very careful. The government should hold equity no longer than necessary to restructure the banks, resume normal lending and recoup at least a portion of taxpayer investment.”


Former Banking Crises

Bank Failures, Danish Style

Randall Podenza, 8/03/90

"An institution that fails to meet Danish capital standards is subject to rapid sanctions. For losses which cause an institution's capital-to-asset ratio to fall below six percent, the bank must immediately seek additional capital in the marketplace. At most, the bank has until its next shareholders meeting to raise at lease 75% of the capital shortfall. If necessary capital is not provided, closure is immediate."

The Swedish Experience

Governor Urban Bäckström, 8/29/97

"The Swedish Bank Support Authority had to choose between two alternative strategies. The first method involves deferring the reporting of losses for as long as is legally possible and using the bank's current income for a gradual write-down of the loss making assets. One advantage of this method is that it helps to avoid the bank being forced to massive sales of assets at prices below long run market values. A serious disadvantage is that the method presupposes that the bank problems can be resolved relatively quickly; otherwise the difficulties compound, leading to much greater problems when they ultimately materialise. The handling of problems among savings and loan institution in the United States in the 1980s is a case in point. With the other method, an open account of all expected losses and writedowns is presented at an early stage. This clarifies the extent of the problems and the support that is required. Provided the authorities and the banks make it credible that no additional problems have been concealed, this procedure also promotes confidence. It entails a risk of creating an exaggerated perception of the magnitude of the problems, for instance if real estate that has been taken over at unduly cautiously estimated values in a market that is temporarily depressed. This can lead, for instance, to borrowers in temporary difficulties being forced to accept harsher terms, which in turn can result in payments being suspended. The Swedish authorities opted for the second method: disclose expected loan losses and assign realistic values to real estate and other assets."

Stopping a Financial Crisis, the Swedish Way

CARTER DOUGHERTY, 9/23/08
"A banking system in crisis after the collapse of a housing bubble. An economy hemorrhaging jobs. A market-oriented government struggling to stem the panic. Sound familiar? It does to Sweden. The country was so far in the hole in 1992 — after years of imprudent regulation, short-sighted economic policy and the end of its property boom — that its banking system was, for all practical purposes, insolvent. But Sweden took a different course than the one now being proposed by the United States Treasury. And Swedish officials say there are lessons from their own nightmare that Washington may be missing."

The Asian Crisis: A View from the IMF

Stanley Fischer, First Deputy Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund, 1/22/98

"Likewise, we have been urged not to recommend rapid action on banks. However, it would be a mistake to allow clearly bankrupt banks to remain open, as this would be a recipe for perpetuating the region's financial crisis, not resolving it. The best course is to recapitalize or close insolvent banks, protect small depositors, and require shareholders to take their losses. At the same time, banking regulation and supervision must be improved."

The Aftermath of Financial Crises
Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff, 12/19/08"Reinhart and Rogoff (2008a) included all the major postwar banking crises in the developed world (a total of 18) and put particular emphasis on the ones dubbed “the big five” (Spain 1977, Norway 1987, Finland, 1991, Sweden, 1991, and Japan, 1992). It is now beyond contention that the present U.S. financial crisis is severe by any metric."
Worse than Japan?
The Economist, 2/12/09
"A similar dynamic will surely play out in America’s over-indebted households. With their assets worth less and credit tight, people will be forced to save much more than they used to. The household saving rate has risen to 3.6% of disposable income after being negative in 2007. For much of the post-war period it was around 8%, and in the short-term it could easily exceed that. But, whereas dis-saving by Japanese households countered the corporate balance-sheet adjustment, American firms are unlikely to invest more while consumers are in a funk. Propping up demand may therefore require more persistent, and sustained, budget deficits than in Japan."
-----


Special thanks to Passport Capital for sharing their suggested reading list. And, as always, if you have any articles you think are essential reads, feel free to contact us.

Jon Stewart's Daily Show Makes Fun of CNBC

Thought it would be good to add in some humor here. Here's Jim Cramer's appearance on Jon Stewart's Daily Show.

The Daily Show With Jon StewartM - Th 11p / 10c

Jim Cramer Pt. 1

Daily Show Full Episodes
Important Things w/ Demetri Martin

Political Humor
Jim Cramer

The Daily Show With Jon StewartM - Th 11p / 10c

Jim Cramer Pt. 2

Daily Show Full Episodes
Important Things w/ Demetri Martin

Political Humor
Jim Cramer

The Daily Show With Jon StewartM - Th 11p / 10c

Jim Cramer Pt. 3

Daily Show Full Episodes
Important Things w/ Demetri Martin

Political Humor
Jim Cramer

If you've missed it, here's Comedy Central's Jon Stewart making fun of CNBC on his Daily Show. He goes through past clips of various CNBC commentators predicting things and then compares their predictions to present day. It's downright hilarious. (RSS & Email readers might need to come to the blog). Check it out:

What We're Reading (3/13/09)

Hedge Funds: The Road Back (TheStreet, Eric Jackson)

Crash course on all things Benjamin Graham (Morningstar)

Dark future for Evergreen Solar (10Q Detective)

Exposing Apollo's (APOL) Dirty Secret (Citron Research)

Video (caution, strong language): The New F*cking Citibank (funnyordie)

John Griffin's Blue Ridge Capital 13F Filing: Q4 2008

This is the 4th Quarter 2008 edition of our ongoing hedge fund portfolio tracking series. Before reading this update, make sure you check out the Hedge Fund 13F filings preface.

Next up, we have John Griffin's Blue Ridge Capital. Now, Griffin is similar to Stephen Mandel at Lone Pine Capital, Andreas Halvorsen at Viking Global, and Lee Ainslie at Maverick Capital in that they all are 'Tiger Cubs' (a.k.a. pupils of Julian Robertson while at Tiger Management). Griffin though, is more well known because he was Julian Robertson's right hand man. So, needless to say, he knows his stuff. Blue Ridge seeks absolute returns by investing in companies who dominate their industries and shorting the companies who have fundamental problems. Do note that the 13F filing only requires funds to disclose long positions (unless they are short via puts, we can see those). In the past, we have, however, gotten one sneak peek at what Blue Ridge has been shorting. Both Griffin at Blue Ridge and Lee Ainslie over at Maverick Capital like to effectively hedge with a solid balance of both long and short positions (like a true hedge fund... not like some of the crazy funds these days that aren't truly hedged).

Griffin attended the University of Virginia for undergrad and received his MBA from Stanford. Recently, the University of Virginia hosted a hedge fund panel which consisted of many of the 'Tiger Cubs' as well as the founder of Tiger Management, Julian Robertson. At the panel, numerous hedge fund managers laid out some of their investment theses. Additionally, we noted that in the past, Blue Ridge has disclosed a 5.47% stake in Millipore (MIL).

The following were their long equity, note, and options holdings as of December 31st, 2008 as filed with the SEC. We have not detailed the changes to every single position in this update, but we have covered all the major moves. All holdings are common stock unless otherwise denoted.


Some New Positions (Brand new positions that they initiated in the last quarter):
Microsoft (MSFT)
National Oilwell Varco (NOV)
Mastercard (MA)
Genentech (DNA)
Petrobras (PBR)
XTO Energy (XTO)
Agnico Eagle Mines (AEM)
Discovery Communications (DISCA)
Devon Energy (DVN)
American Express (AXP)
Yamana Gold (AUY)
Market Vectors Gold Miners (GDX)
Monsanto (MON)
Discovery Communications (DISCK)
Newmont Mining (NEM)
Goldcorp (GG)
Crown Castle (CCI)
Dell (DELL)
Ishares Biotech (IBB)
Calpine (CPN)
Blackrock (BLK)
Google (GOOG)
Valero (VLO)
Marathon Oil (MRO)
KBR (KBR)
EOG Resources (EOG)
Wynn Resorts (WYNN)
iShares Mexico (EWW)
VimpelComm (VIP)
General Growth Properties (GGP)


Some Increased Positions (A few positions they already owned but added shares to)
Amgen (AMGN): Increased position by 182%
Greenlight Capital Re (GLRE): Increased position by 150%
Amazon (AMZN): Increased position by 26%
Berkshire Hathaway (BRK-A): Increased position by 18%
SPDR Gold Trust (GLD): Increased position by 16%
Goodrich Petroleum (GDP): Increased position by 15.9%
Millipore (MIL): Increased position by 11.9%
Covanta (CVA): Increased position by 8%


Some Reduced Positions (Some positions they sold some shares of - note not all sales listed)
Compton Petroleum (CMZ): Reduced position by 94.8%
Grupo Televisa (TV): Reduced position by 80.9%
Target (TGT): Reduced position by 71%
Anadarko Petroleum (APC): Reduced position by 51%
Exterran Holdings (EXH): Reduced position by 43%
Thermo Fisher Scientific (TMO): Reduced position by 42%
Fomento Economico (FMX): Reduced position by 33.9%
Visa (V): Reduced position by 30%
Grupo Aeroportuario Pacifico (PAC): Reduced position by 14%


Removed Positions (Positions they sold out of completely)
Washington Mutual (WM) Puts
Perfect World (PWRD)
Elong (LONG)
Gold Reserve (GRZ)
Wachovia (WB-PT) Preferred T
Foster Wheeler (FWLT)
Las Vegas Sands (LVS)
Lululemon (LULU)
Goldman Sachs (GS)
Illumina (ILMN)
American Express (AXP) Calls
Eagle Materials (EXP)
MBIA (MBI)
Discovery Holdings (DSY)
Martin Marietta (MLM)
Hansen Natural (HANS)


Top 20 Holdings (by % of portfolio)

1. Microsoft (MSFT): 6.3% of portfolio
2. Covanta (CVA): 5.63% of portfolio
3. Berkshire Hathaway (BRK-A): 5.58% of portfolio
4. National Oilwell Varco (NOV): 4.99% of portfolio
5. Mastercard (MA): 4.94% of portfolio
6. Amgen (AMGN): 4.68% of portfolio
7. Millipore (MIL): 4.58% of portfolio
8. Amazon (AMZN): 4.42% of portfolio
9. Genentech (DNA): 3.67% of portfolio
10. SPDR Gold Trust (GLD): 3.22% of portfolio
11. Petroleo Brasileiro (PBR): 2.78% of portfolio
12. XTO Energy (XTO): 2.57% of portfolio
13. Broadridge Financial (BR): 2.47% of portfolio
14. Agnico Eagle Mines (AEM): 2.36% of portfolio
15. Discovery Communications (DISCA): 2.21% of portfolio
16. Devon Energy (DVN): 2.18% of portfolio
17. American Express (AXP): 2.16% of portfolio
18. Yamana Gold (AUY): 1.9% of portfolio
19. Market Vectors Gold Miners (GDX): 1.78% of portfolio
20. Monsanto (MON): 1.68% of portfolio
    

They added Microsoft in a big way last quarter, starting it as a new position and bringing it all the way up to their top holding. Like Maverick, we also see that Blue Ridge sees value in Berkshire Hathaway here. And, like David Einhorn and Greenlight, they also like Gold and Gold Miners here. Assets from the collective long US equity, options, and note holdings were $2.6 billion last quarter and were $3.39 billion this quarter. This is just one of many funds in our hedge fund portfolio tracking series in which we're tracking 35+ prominent funds. We've already covered Paulson & Co (John Paulson), Carl Icahn, Warren Buffett, Stephen Mandel's Lone Pine Capital, George Soros, Bill Ackman's Pershing Square, Andreas Halvorsen's Viking Global, Timothy Barakett's Atticus Capital, David Einhorn's Greenlight Capital, Seth Klarman's Baupost Group, Peter Thiel's Clarium Capital, Bret Barakett's Tremblant Capital, David Stemerman's Conatus Capital, James Pallotta's Raptor Capital Management, and Lee Ainslie's Maverick Capital. Look for our updates as we will be covering a new fund each day.

Nouriel Roubini & Robert Shiller's S&P 500 Price Targets

Well, you guessed it. I'm here to post up even more bullish news! And, by bullish news, I obviously mean bearish news. After all, its Nouriel Roubini and Robert Shiller. Here's the deal, Shiller has a set of S&P earnings and P/E ratios available in spreadsheet format here. Big hat tip to Cliff Küle for flagging this Schiller data and graphs to our attention. Cliff posts up some historical info, illustrated below. First, real S&P composite earnings:

(click to enlarge)

And secondly, historical P/E ratios and interest rates.

(click to enlarge)

By that historical data, you'd think that a 5 P/E could be achieved given the severity of everything that's happened. But, if you're not that apocalyptic, then maybe somewhere around 10x would be more appropriate. And, 'Dr. Doom' himself, Nouriel Roubini thinks that the S&P500 will see 600, which could be somewhat close to 10x by his measurement. Taken from Bloomberg,

"

The benchmark index for U.S. stocks would have to slump 12 percent from last week’s closing level to meet his forecast. Roubini is assuming that companies in the S&P 500 will report profit of $50 a share this year and investors will pay 12 times that for equities.

'My main scenario is that it’s highly likely it goes to 600 or below,' Roubini said today in an interview at the Chicago Board Options Exchange Risk Management Conference in Dana Point, California. A level of '500 is less likely, but there is some possibility you get there.'

"

S&P500 Companies: Pension Deficits and EPS Impact

Just wanted to highlight some great lists via Zero Hedge of companies who are going to be facing some problems when it comes to pension underfunding.

This first list is just a broad overview of who could potentially be the most affected.

(click to enlarge)

And this second list looks at possible EPS impact due to pension expense going forward.

(click to enlarge)

Make sure to head to Zero Hedge for the rest of the commentary.

Eric Hovde Says We're in a Depression

Eric Hovde of $1 billion long/short Hovde Capital says we're in a depression. He sees commercial real estate defaults hitting as high as 25%. His commentary on the CNBC video below:

Lee Ainslie's Maverick Capital 13F Filing: Q4 2008

This is the 4th Quarter 2008 edition of our ongoing hedge fund portfolio tracking series. Before reading this update, make sure you check out the Hedge Fund 13F filings preface.

Next up, we have Maverick Capital. Lee Ainslie started Maverick Capital back in 1993 with $38 million. Nowadays, the fund is worth $4 billion. Ainslie, like many of the other fund managers we've profiled, has a background rooted in learning from legendary great Julian Robertson at Tiger Management. These proteges (nicknamed 'Tiger Cubs') learned from the best and have had great success running their own funds. Some of the other Tiger Cubs include Stephen Mandel's Lone Pine Capital and Andreas Halvorsen's Viking Global. Maverick's strategy is straight up stock picking, both long and short. While they focus on both the long and short sides of the book, they do not employ pairs trades.

They try to hedge their positions like the true definition of a hedge fund. Maverick uses a value approach (obviously learned from Julian) and one of their most popular metrics is finding companies and comparing their enterprise value to sustainable free cash flow. Their Maverick Fund finished -26.2% for 2008, as noted in our year-end hedge fund performance numbers post. Some of their notable past activity includes selling out of their entire Under Armour (UA) position via a 13G filing.

The following were their long equity, note, and options holdings as of December 31st, 2008 as filed with the SEC. We have not detailed the changes to every single position in this update, but we have covered all the major moves. All holdings are common stock unless otherwise denoted.


Some New Positions (Brand new positions that they initiated in the last quarter):
Qualcomm (QCOM)
Staples (SPLS)
Carnival (CCL)
Pfizer (PFE)
JPMorgan Chase (JPM)
Eaton (ETN)
Biogen Idec (BIIB)
Macys (M)
Genentech (DNA)
Cummins (CMI)
Renaissance Holdings (RNR)
Discovery Communications (DISCA)
Discovery Communications (DISCK)
State Street (STT)
American Tower (AMT)
Xenoport (XNPT)
Chico Fas (CHS)
The Finish Line (FINL)
Petroquest (PQ)
Gymboree (GYMB)
Healthnet (HNT)
Interval Leisure (IILG)


Some Increased Positions (A few positions they already owned but added shares to)
DirecTV (DTV): Increased position by 92.6%
Berkshire Hathaway (BRK-A): Increased position by 73%
XTO Energy (XTO): Increased position by 36%
Cognizant (CTSH): Increased position by 33.9%
Fidelity Information (FIS): Increased position by 18.8%


Some Reduced Positions (Some positions they sold some shares of - note not all sales listed)
Netapp (NTAP): Reduced position by 77.8%
Apollo Group (APOL): Reduced position by 64.2%
ThermoFisher Scientific (TMO): Reduced position by 64%
Lorillard (LO): Reduced position by 61%
Citrix (CTXS): Reduced position by 53.6%
First Solar (FSLR): Reduced position by 51.5%
Gilead (GILD): Reduced position by 46.5%
America Movil (AMX): Reduced position by 40.7%
Marvell (MRVL): Reduced position by 38%
Priceline (PCLN): Reduced position by 37.7%
Dicks Sporting Goods (DKS): Reduced position by 37.5%
Baxter (BAX): Reduced position by 31%
Infinera (INFN): Reduced position by 30%
DeVry (DV): Reduced position by 28.9%
Amgen (AMGN): Reduced position by 28.6%
Apple (AAPL): Reduced position by 25.96%
Berkshire Hathaway (BRK-B): Reduced position by 35.5%
Research in Motion (RIMM): Reduced position by 21.3%
Raytheon (RTN): Reduced position by 19.6%


Removed Positions (Positions they sold out of completely)
First Marblehead (FMD)
Comscore (SCOR)
Salesforce (CRM)
Hudson City Bancorp (HCBK)
JCrew (JCG)
VMWare (VMW)
Las Vegas Sands (LVS)
Leap Wireless (LEAP)
Freeport McMoran (FCX)
Lamar Advertising (LAMR)
Goldman Sachs (GS)
Yingli Green Energy (YGE)
M&T (MTB)
Digital River (DRIV)
Potash (POT)
Cardinal Health (CAH)
Morgan Stanley (MS)
BB&T (BBT)
MetroPCS (PCS)
UnderArmour (UA)
Resmed (RMD)
Dish Network (DISH)
Western Union (WU)
Marsh & McLennan (MMC)
Schering Plough (SGP)
Burlington Northern (BNI)
Activision (ATVI)
Cigna (CI)
Monsanto (MON)
Advanced Micro Devices (AMD)


Top 20 Holdings (by % of portfolio)

1. CVS Caremark (CVS): 4.25% of the portfolio
2. Raytheon (RTN): 4.17% of the portfolio
3. Qualcomm (QCOM): 3.85% of the portfolio
4. Amgen (AMGN): 3.7% of the portfolio
5. Apple (AAPL): 3.37% of the portfolio
6. XTO Energy (XTO): 3.13% of the portfolio
7. Gilead Sciences (GILD): 2.84% of the portfolio
8. Staples (SPLS): 2.56% of the portfolio
9. Research in Motion (RIMM): 2.5% of the portfolio
10. Apollo Group (APOL): 2.5% of the portfolio
11. Baxter International (BAX): 2.4% of the portfolio
12. Marvell Technology (MRVL): 2.4% of the portfolio
13. Fidelity Information (FIS): 2.4% of the portfolio
14. Liberty Media (LMDIA): 2.37% of the portfolio
15. DirecTV (DTV): 2.35% of the portfolio
16. Wyeth (WYE): 2.34% of the portfolio
17. Carnival (CCL): 2.25% of the portfolio
18. America Movil (AMX): 2.21% of the portfolio
19. Berkshire Hathaway (BRK-A): 2.11% of the portfolio
20. Priceline (PCLN): 2.1% of the portfolio

Right from the start we notice common holdings with that of other Tiger Cub hedge funds. Apollo Group, America Movil, Qualcomm, and Carnival are all favorites of these various funds. And, its no surprise really, as they all come from the same school of thought. And, undoubtedly, they all stay in touch. Its also worth noting that they started new positions in some names and brought them up in size to the top 20 holdings. Some of these include Carnival, Qualcomm, and Staples. Other than that, they were doing a lot of selling across the board. Assets from the collective long US equity, options, and note holdings were $8.2 billion last quarter and were down to $4.8 billion this quarter. This is just one of many funds in our hedge fund portfolio tracking series in which we're tracking 35+ prominent funds. We've already covered Paulson & Co (John Paulson), Carl Icahn, Warren Buffett, Stephen Mandel's Lone Pine Capital, George Soros, Bill Ackman's Pershing Square, Andreas Halvorsen's Viking Global, Timothy Barakett's Atticus Capital, David Einhorn's Greenlight Capital, Seth Klarman's Baupost Group, Peter Thiel's Clarium Capital, Bret Barakett's Tremblant Capital, David Stemerman's Conatus Capital, and James Pallotta's Raptor Capital Management. Look for our updates as we will be covering a new fund each day.

Citadel Starting New Hedge Funds

Ken Griffin's Citadel has plans to roll out a few more funds, even after their flagship funds had a rough year in 2008. One will focus on currencies and interest rates, one will focus on stocks, and another will focus on convertible bonds. They're trying to roll out lower fee funds in an effort to attract more investors. Additionally, they're hoping to raise $2-5 billion for the Global Macro Fund. We'd mentioned this fund back in September, as it will be ran by Kaveh Alamouti. Additionally, back in December, we noted that they had opened their Tactical Trading fund to investors. Lastly, Citadel also amended their redemption 'policy' and readers can read about it in one of their recent letters to investors.

Money On the Sidelines Is the Key to Next Market Rally

Just wanted to post up this excellent graphic, courtesy of Todd Sullivan's Value Plays. This depicts just how much money is on the sidelines right now as people are scared to get back into the market. If and when this money decides to return, there could be quite a violent rally. But, of course, that actually requires people to dip their toe back in. Make sure to read Todd's write-up as well.

(click to enlarge)

What One Trillion Dollars Looks Like

Wow, this is insane. With what seems like a bailout every month in this crazy crisis, we thought it'd be interesting to find an illustration of just how much money is being tossed around like chips in a poker game. Seriously though, isn't everyone just numb when the terms "billions" and "trillions" get tossed around now? We've been talking about such large sums for so long that it doesn't even faze me anymore, which is concerning. Billion is the new million, and trillion is the new billion.

With the help of PageTutor, we can put this into perspective. First, for a frame of reference. This is a pallet of some dollar packets. This pallet below represents $100 million.

(click to enlarge)

So, now that you know what $100 million looks like. Here's what One Trillion Dollars looks like.

(click to enlarge)

Notice the little person in the bottom left hand corner for a frame of reference. Also note that each little stack in the picture is actually 2 pallets. So, each little stack is $200 million. Add up that field of double-stacked pallets and you've got a grand total of $1 trillion. No big deal. Make sure to head to Page Tutor for the full pictorial.

James Pallotta's Raptor Capital Management 13D & 13G Filings

This is the 4th Quarter 2008 edition of our ongoing hedge fund portfolio tracking series. Before reading this update, make sure you check out the Hedge Fund 13F filings preface.

Next up is James Pallotta's Raptor Capital Management. This update is slightly different than the majority of our 13F tracking posts simply because they haven't filed a 13F yet, as they are a newer fund. We've actually been tracking this development since back in August. However, they have filed a few 13D and 13G's back in mid January. So, we're going to go ahead and start coverage on them considering that we will be watching them going forward. We're tracking newly formed/spun-off Raptor simply because it is ran by James Pallotta, who previously ran Tudor Investment Corp's equity fund for many years. The fund was actually called the Raptor fund and as such, Pallotta has spun it off as his own fund and kept the name. So, in all the prior updates of Tudor Investment Corp's 13Fs, we were tracking Pallotta. We'll monitor Pallotta's Raptor now and then we'll continue to monitor Tudor's equity holdings as well.

Pallotta places global macro style bets on equities and is somewhat similar to a few other concentrated portfolio funds we follow. While at Tudor, Pallotta helped generate 14% annual returns ever since 1993. So, let's cover the developments thus far. All of the filings discussed below were filed on January 12th, 2009. In a 13D filed with the SEC, Raptor Capital Management has disclosed a 43.1% stake in Uni-Pixel (UNXL) with 17,343,760 shares beneficially owned. Additionally, they also filed a 13G, disclosing a 7.12% stake in BigString Corp (BSGC) with 4,004,288 shares beneficially owned. Lastly, they also show a 13G disclosing a 6% stake in Enherent Corp (ENHT) with 3,142,826 shares beneficially owned. All of the filings were made due to activity on January 1st, 2009.

We'll continue to monitor any filings and activity from Raptor from here on out as we bring them into the mix. This is just one of many funds in our hedge fund portfolio tracking series in which we're tracking 35+ prominent funds. We've already covered Paulson & Co (John Paulson), Carl Icahn, Warren Buffett, Stephen Mandel's Lone Pine Capital, George Soros, Bill Ackman's Pershing Square, Andreas Halvorsen's Viking Global, Timothy Barakett's Atticus Capital, David Einhorn's Greenlight Capital, Seth Klarman's Baupost Group, Peter Thiel's Clarium Capital, Bret Barakett's Tremblant Capital, and David Stemerman's Conatus Capital. Look for our updates as we will be covering a new fund each day.

Kyle Bass Hayman Capital Letter to Investors

The latest from Kyle Bass, who's Hayman is up over 340% since inception due to profiting off of subprime and other things. He also finished 2008 up 6%. See a past letter of his in our investor letters post. (RSS & Email readers may need to come to the blog to see it).

Publish at Scribd or explore others: Engineering Research business social

[hat tip to Zero Hedge who seemingly has an endless supply of these]

Gap Between Tangible Common Equity and Tier 1 Capital

Since yesterday we took a glance at tangible book/asset ratios, we'll today take a glance at tangible common equity and tier 1 capital ratios courtesy of Paul Kedrosky. Keep in mind, obviously, that you need to take all of these ratios that we've been throwing at you with a grain of salt. (Taking things with a grain of salt seems to be the theme this week, slash this entire crisis). Because, of course, a few ratios here and there are not even close to being able to sum up a financial institution's situation. Note that tangible common equity is typically the more 'stringent' of the two measurements.

(click to enlarge)

Possible Drug Company Mergers, Buyouts, & Takeovers

Hot off the heels of the Wyeth (WYE) and Pfizer (PFE), as well as the Merck (MRK) and Schering-Plough (SGP) deals, we thought it would be fitting to post up this graphic hypothesizing possible mergers in the drug industry. (Keep in mind that this was released before the MRK bid). Courtesy of the NYT, we see a great graphic depicting the current landscape where it hypothesizes that Crucell, Bristol Myers Squibb, and Gilead would have the most plausible suitors.

(click to enlarge)

David Stemerman's Conatus Capital 13F Filing: Q4 2008

This is the 4th Quarter 2008 edition of our ongoing hedge fund portfolio tracking series. Before reading this update, make sure you check out the Hedge Fund 13F filings preface.

Next up is David Stemerman's Conatus Capital. This is the first time we've covered Conatus and it is a new addition to the group of funds we cover. They filed their first 13F this past quarter and so we finally get to see what they've been up to. David Stemerman left Stephen Mandel's Lone Pine Capital to run his own fund, as we noted here. The result is Conatus Capital which raised $2.3 billion and started trading last year. Numerous other prominent funds have seen managers leave to start their own funds and we're also monitoring those as well.

While 13F filings do not show cash or short positions, they do show the long positions. Conatus' filing shows them owning only a little over $621 million worth of long equity. Since this is literally the first 13F filed by them, we'll do things a little differently here. There are no 'changes' to report since we don't have a previous 13F to compare this to, so we'll simply just outline their entire long portfolio below.

The following were their long equity, note, and options holdings as of December 31st, 2008 as filed with the SEC. All holdings are common stock unless otherwise denoted.



Conatus' Entire Portfolio (by % of portfolio)

1. People's United Financial (PBCT): 9.19% of portfolio
2. Walmart (WMT): 7.75% of portfolio
3. Apollo Group (APOL): 6.51% of portfolio
4. Medco Health (MHS): 6.27% of portfolio
5. Covidien (COV): 6.24% of portfolio
6. Baxter (BAX): 6.14% of portfolio
7. Cisco (CSCO): 5.94% of portfolio
8. Visa (V): 5.93% of portfolio
9. American Tower (AMT): 5.59% of portfolio
10. C H Robinson (CHRW): 5.1% of portfolio
11. Qualcomm (QCOM): 4.75% of portfolio
12. Discovery Class C (DISCK): 4.36% of portfolio
13. Express Scripts (ESRX): 4.19% of portfolio
14. Carnival Paired Certificate (CVC1): 3.98% of portfolio
15. Dicks Sporting Goods (DKS): 3.26% of portfolio
16. Cognizant (CTSH): 3.26% of portfolio
17. Strayer Education (STRA): 3.2% of portfolio
18. Bed Bath & Beyond (BBBY): 3.09% of portfolio
19. SBA Communications (SBAC): 3.07% of portfolio
20. Discovery Class A (DISCA): 2.17% of portfolio

And, since this is their first ever filing, here is the 13F in its entirety for those curious:

(click to enlarge)

Overall, you can see hints of a Tiger Cub portfolio here. Obviously, Conatus is somewhat similar to Lone Pine in methodology since that's where Stemerman plied his trade. Conatus has a position in Visa (V) and Qualcomm (QCOM), like many of the other Tiger Cub hedge funds. Additionally, their large position in Apollo Group (APOL) is shared by Andreas Halvorsen's Viking Global. But, there are definitely some differences between their portfolios now that Stemerman runs Conatus. For instance, Conatus has a large position in People's United Financial (PBCT) and Walmart (WMT), two names not found in other similar portfolios. So, while their portfolio has hints of a Tiger Cub background, it is still unique in its own right.

This is just one of many funds in our hedge fund portfolio tracking series in which we're tracking 35+ prominent funds. We've already covered Paulson & Co (John Paulson), Carl Icahn, Warren Buffett, Stephen Mandel's Lone Pine Capital, George Soros, Bill Ackman's Pershing Square, Andreas Halvorsen's Viking Global, Timothy Barakett's Atticus Capital, David Einhorn's Greenlight Capital, Seth Klarman's Baupost Group, Peter Thiel's Clarium Capital, and Bret Barakett's Tremblant Capital. Look for our updates as we will be covering a new fund each day.

A Look At Financial Instutions' Tangible Book / Asset Ratio

We recently read some very interesting research courtesy of Pali Capital that examined the tangible book/asset ratio of various financial institutions. They looked at this ratio of institutions all over the world and so we wanted to highlight some of the major ones we saw. For instance, we see that Washington Mutual, who already essentially 'went under' by nature of forced acquisition, has a tangible book/asset ratio of 3.66. And, that number is on the higher end of the scale/list. So, the thinking would be that many of the institutions with ratios lower than that could potentially be in trouble as well. Because, after all, their ratios would be categorically 'worse' than that of an institution that's already had problems. Of course, we do realize that each institution is an individual entity and should be treated as such; its situational. But, as we run through the list, you'll start to notice that the lower the ratio, the more troubled banks we run into. Let's have a look, noting that those listed in bold have either already failed, been forcibly acquired, or are known to have major problems.

First, the US banks & their tangible book/asset ratios:

BB&T (BBT) 6.86
PNC (PNC) 5.87
Northern Trust (NTRS) 5.51
Goldman Sachs (GS) 4.86
Morgan Stanley (MS) 4.35
JPMorgan (JPM) 3.83
Washington Mutual (WM) 3.66
---
Wells Fargo (WFC) 3.50
Merrill Lynch (MER) 2.84
Bank of America (BAC) 2.83
US Bancorp (USB) 2.74
Lehman Brothers (LEHMQ) 2.39
Citigroup (C) 1.52

And now the Internationals & their tangible book/asset ratios:

Mediobanca (MB:IM) 8.35
Unione di Banche Italiane (UBI:IM) 5.1
Intensa Sanpaolo (ISP:IM) 4.5
Banco Santander (STD) 3.76
---
Unicredit (UCG) 2.82
Societe Generale (GLE) 2.68
HBOS (HBOS:LN) 2.55
Credit Agricole (EPA:ACA) 2.38
Lloyds (LLOY) 2.26
BNP Paribas (BNP) 2.12
Credit Suisse (CSGN) 1.94
Barclays (BCS) 1.28
ING Groep (ING) 1.18
Deutsche Bank (DB) 1.17
Northern Rock (NRK:LN) 1.07
UBS (UBS) 1.06
RBS (RBS) 0.95

Again, note that those listed in bold have either already failed, been forcibly acquired, or are known to have major problems. You'll also notice that the international banks seem to be in worse shape by examining this ratio alone. So, that should be interesting to watch. It's no surprise to see Citigroup at the bottom of the US list, considering how much trouble they're in and how much government assistance they've needed. And, similarly, RBS has been in a world of hurt on the international side and has the overall lowest ratio of all the institutions measured, regardless of region.

We've noted in the past that hedge fund Paulson & Co has made a fortune by betting against all things sub-prime. Additionally, they've profited from shorting UK financials and in particular, they've focused on Lloyds. Also, in our hedge fund tracking series, we recently covered Paulson's portfolio, which you can view here, along with his year-end letter & report. He's been quite successful, having made correct bets against Barclays, RBS, and Lloyds (which all conveniently fall at the lower end of the list above). We would be remiss though if we didn't point out the fact that John Paulson has become slightly constructive on some other destroyed assets he had been previously short, and is looking to slowly start buying them. It remains to be seen though if he would reverse such a bet against the institutions themselves.

Obviously, not all institutions are listed here. We noted back in January that many people thought HSBC needed capital as well. But then again, who doesn't need capital these days? And, back in October, we had examined the leverage ratios of financial institutions. But then again, who doesn't need to delever these days?

Keep in mind this is simply one aspect of an enormously big picture in a gorge of an industry right now. You cannot even begin to unravel the woven complexities of a financial institution from a few ratios here and there. We just thought the information was interesting and highlighted that even institutions with ratios perceived to be of 'better quality than others' did not escape unscathed (i.e. WaMu). Which, by the way, is pushing the definition of 'quality' to an extreme for sure. Everyone should, of course, take all these ratios and measurements with a grain of salt. For instance, if you look at Bank of America's (BAC) tangible common equity at the end of last year, you'll note that it was a positive $35 billion before acquiring Merrill Lynch (MER), but then falls to a negative number once everything is marked at fair value and adjusted. Jonathan Weil at Bloomberg notes that if you use these fair value numbers, Bank of America needs a ton more common equity. He also examines Wells Fargo (WFC) and finds the same underlying problem. Their tangible common equity was a positive $13 billion at the end of last year. But, if you adjust everything to fair value, it also becomes negative.

This obviously highlights the recurring problems of the abyss known as a financial institution's balance sheet. So many balance sheets essentially have artificial values in place and its impossible to gauge just how well or poorly positioned they might be. We will just go out on a limb (not much of a limb, really) and assume that everyone's just simply going to need more capital. End of.

And now back to your regularly scheduled implosion.

World's Biggest Hedge Funds

(click to enlarge)

Great updated graphic showing the world's current largest hedge funds by assets under management. Also, check out Alpha's hedge fund rankings for 2008 if you've missed it.

[hat tip to Zero Hedge for the graphic]

Clarium Capital February 2009 Performance

Here's the latest from Peter Thiel and gang.

• February: -2.3%
• YTD: 4.3%

Make sure to also check out our recent look at Clarium's tiny equity portfolio.

(click to enlarge)