Continuing the series of notes from the CIMA Conference (Columbia Investment Management Association), we shift to Fairholme Capital's founder Bruce Berkowitz and his basic checklist for investing as well as what he's learned as an investor.
Bruce Berkowitz's Basic Checklist For Investing
1. Can you kill the investment? Is there adult supervision at the company?
2. Is the company essential? Does it depend upon the kindness of strangers?
3. What can the company make? Reasonable profitability for owners?
4. How are owners paid? Distributions?
5. Management - honest in past and present?
6. Does accounting reflect reality?
7. Does the balance sheet match up with the income statement?
8. Catalysts - Buybacks? Misunderstood? Is enterprise having a big problem that is fixable? Everyone's been burned by the stock so afraid to buy it.
9. Are there irrational fears of current headwinds?
10. Does the business have pricing power or unit growth?
11. Can you hold the investment for a long time & does it improve portfolio performance?
On Financials: He's "all in" on financials now. American International Group (AIG). CIT Group (CIT): misunderstood. Bank of American (BAC): misunderstood. Fixable problems. Likes holding companies like Berkshire Hathaway (BRK.A / BRK.B) or Sears Holdings (SHLD). No interest in Europe, plenty to do in the US.
On Sears (SHLD): "I'm happy for people to push down the price." You have to understand the history of anchors in malls in the US to appreciate Sears and Kmart.
Top Ten Lessons Berkowitz Wishes He Learned Long Ago:
1. You always have to have cash, especially when no one else has it. (John Burbank of Passport Capital has said the same: "Cash is most valuable when others don't have it.")
2. No free lunch- it’s not free, or it’s not lunch.
3. You can’t change people! You can change yourself, but not others.
4. You only see reality under extreme stress- you want to get to know someone, you need to see them under extreme stress. (MF note: Completely baseless guess, but does anyone else think he's possibly referencing the situation where Fernandez left FairholmeCap here?)
5. Volatility is not risk!
6. Always assume you will have bad luck.
7. Few variables to win. Once you have to think about more than 3 variables, your odds of winning are low.
8. If you have to use more than 6th grade math, you’re in trouble.
For the rest of the notes from the CIMA Conference, head to these posts:
- Dan Loeb: Lessons He's Learned as an Investor
- David Einhorn Question & Answer Session
- Distressed Investing Panel (Dan Loeb & Daniel Krueger)
- Long/Short Equity Investing Panel: Whitney Tilson
- Bill Miller on What Stock He Likes Now
- Michael Karsch on Risk Management
- Bruce Greenwald's Market Comments
Thursday, March 29, 2012
Bruce Berkowitz's Basic Checklist For Investing: CIMA Conference
Bill Miller on What Stocks He Likes Now: CIMA Conference
Continuing the series of notes from the CIMA Conference (Columbia Investment Management Association), we move on to the presentation and Q&A from Legg Mason's Bill Miller.
Bill Miller on What Stocks He Likes Now
He started out discussing how he is different from traditional value investors. Low P/E, low cash flow not enough. Focus on long-term creation of business value, the future, not just the past. Allowed them to avoid the terrible returns of value investors. How does he invest in tech? There are a few platforms that are locked in long-term. They did do 10-year projections on Amazon. If you think through it carefully, you CAN make long-term projections on tech. (They are doing it with Facebook now).
AMZN example: high growth, high valuation companies, in aggregate, have small chance of maintaining that rate. But some can. What is the probability that this is an exception to the base rate? Once companies get a certain level of market share, it is very difficult for that share to be eroded. (Network effect). True even with low barriers to entry. You want a business with low switching costs that nobody switches from. GOOG/MSFT search example- GOOG has 66%; MSFT has 14%, even with spending. Once you have stable market shares, and large market. It’s judgment, understanding the industry, not just looking at P/E ratios. They are looking at Facebook now.
AMZN: low 20s GMs, and high cost structure. Bezos exploited technology and customer-focus, to achieve critical mass, costs all up front, market would finance it. When stock was down, Bezos said he was focusing on new markets and customer service. They had a dominating presence by then. Issue now is what is the level of OM long term? Bezos says it will still be a double-digit OM business long-term. Bezos said, “I’m not going to make the Steve Jobs mistake of pricing the iPhone to subsidize the rest of the world R&D by pricing it so high.” IPad is priced much more competitively, so they have total share.
Bruce Greenwald says cloud isn’t that profitable because they have to provide capacity when everyone needs it, so it’s not really just using their excess capacity. The device business is bad, too. Miller says the device business is defensive. All of retail is realizing that AMZN is a threat to EVERY segment. AMZN has all the data about what you buy, like, etc. Ease of use. End market is so large. GOOG: internal discipline issue on capital spending.
How he does valuation? Build probabilistic models. No predictions: what does the market believe, what is embedded in the price, what is the trajectory of the business? INTC, CSCO, AAPL, MSFT, good business with reasonable valuations today.
Macro is fading as an important thing for investors. People have adequately discounted the macro risks.
Biggest Lesson He's Learned: if building an investment business, you need to be different, and right. That will attract assets. He went from zero to 75B in assets. Those assets will also fly out when you are different and wrong. To build a business, be different and right, to retain the business, you have to be a closet indexer.
Things change. Understanding and recognizing them is the key. They were late in the game in recognizing how far valuations would be squeezed by the financial crisis. “Don’t rule anything out.” When in a crisis, wait for the global coordinated action.
Stocks Miller Likes Now:
2008 was a lot of permanent loss, 2011 was temporary losses.
1. Bullish on housing already, all data-driven. KBH up 80% for the year! Still lower than it was a year ago. Housing cycle in process of bottoming, orders are up, better business models. Massive cyclical turn, with profound implications for the US economy.
2. Genworth: Mortgage business down, 50-100% gain in 12 months.
3. Financials: C, BAC below tangible book.
4. Insurance companies: below book value.
5. Airlines: Worst industry in the history of the world. Here’s the difference now. Was commodity business, unionization, high regulation, and fuel costs volatile, fragmented. Highest share was 12% in the US. United now 26%, DAL 25%, so story is consolidated business with better pricing. Positive FCF for 3 years straight now. UAL 40% ROIC. $5 FCF, will be investment grade in a year, trades at 3.5x earnings. Small, risky position.
6. Techs: AAPL, largest position. What kind of company is it? Debate is if Apple is just a really good tech company, what’s it worth? Not much, these things change rapidly. If Apple is a recurring revenue company, consumer products company, then it’s radically mispriced. Bill makes the case that it is a consumer products company; the repurchase rate on the iPhone is 95%. Very few SKUs in line-up. Only 375 stores, only in a third of the carriers worldwide. Share in iPhone doubled from a year ago. Stock is 10x eps and low earnings estimates. 90B in cash, dividend possible. In short term, very low risk. Value it at the least, like a cable company. Compare to KO, or NKE.
7. Facebook: actually, the higher it goes, the more the probability of winning. You can’t look at it like paying $85B for $1B in operating profit. That’s what they DID; they’ll do $2B this year, more than AMZN ever had in history, higher margins, less competition.
Q&A Session:
Why banks? How can you trust the B/S? Have to compare categories to overall market prices. Consolidation means top 6 banks are 63% of GDP. It’s impossible for the US GDP to grow without the assets of the banks growing. Banks as a whole are mispriced, but not compared to each other. BAC has 70B market capital; they were earning 40B a year ago pre-tax, pre-provision. Biggest beneficiary of housing recovery. Can’t get comfortable at the micro level on all their assets, but you can get comfortable about the direction of those assets.
AMZN: can it wipe out other business? Way too early to say. No threat to WMT, COST, JCP.
Market: Best thing for the stock market would be for the bond market to sell off; indicates fear about tail events is dissolving. Biggest risk to the market is Israel attacking Iran. Policy errors. Like in 2008, they wiped out capital as they told people to raise capital.
For the rest of the notes from the CIMA Conference, head to these posts:
- Dan Loeb: Lessons He's Learned as an Investor
- David Einhorn Question & Answer Session
- Bruce Berkowitz's Basic Checklist for Investing & What He's Learned
- Distressed Investing Panel (Dan Loeb & Daniel Krueger)
- Long/Short Equity Investing Panel (Whitney Tilson)
- Michael Karsch on Risk Management
- Bruce Greenwald's Market Comments
Long/Short Equity Investing Panel: Whitney Tilson (CIMA Conference)
Continuing the series of notes from the CIMA Conference (Columbia Investment Management Association), we turn to the long/short equity investing panel with Whitney Tilson of T2 Partners.
Whitney Tilson On Various Longs/Shorts & Lessons Learned
On His Netflix (NFLX) Trade: over 2 years, they’ve broken even. Shorted at 100, covered at 200, felt smart as it went to 300. Wanted to kill themselves as their short thesis played out, got back long on the day in blew up going from 120 to 77 in a day.
Lessons: what they missed on the short side: very dangerous shorting an open-ended situation with a lot of momentum. Both stock and business had momentum, and they didn’t fully appreciate the quality of the business or the momentum the stock has.
Why was he short? Because P/E was 75x, also NFLX needed to invest heavily in streaming content to grow, which would have compressed margins. It happened, should have been more patient before entering the short. Now, balance sheet has tripled in a year, CEO has given up on core business, has bet entire company on the streaming business, with 3B of deals, which is senior to the debt. Stock could be 1000 in 5 years, or zero in 5 years. Each incremental sub is almost pure profit. Good news is they learned the company VERY well and could act very quickly when the stock collapsed. “We didn’t change, the stock price changed.” Every stock in the universe is a long at one price and a short at another price.
On Berkshire Hathaway (BRK.A / BRK.B): 15% position, held continuously for 13 years. Upside, worth 170k, up from 117k. Based on investments 100k per share, then 10x multiple on operating businesses, add it together. Any method you value it, worth at least 150k. Buffett buys it back at book. 8% downside, 50% upside stock. Railroads, housing sensitive business are doing great, insurance business is getting better. What is the bear case? No catalysts. No activists, can’t break it up, no dividend. Cheapness is the only catalyst, and the valuation gap will close. Single biggest area of cheap stocks, they are cheap on risk-adjusted basis.
Tilson on His Short Positions: Says to size your shorts small. Has there ever been a $10B market cap that traded at 10x REV that didn’t collapse?
Lululemon (LULU), Salesforce.com (CRM): good businesses at ridiculous prices
Green Mountain Coffee Roasters (GMCR): OK business, may be chance of fraud of channel stuffing. See David Einhorn's short thesis on GMCR here.
Interoil (IOC): interoil, claims to have found world’s largest natural oil field in Papua New Guinea, they think the value is zero.
Nokia (NOK), Barnes & Noble (BKS): terminal value zero, thinking of adding Research in Motion (RIMM) to the list, waiting for a bounce. Tricky with a lot of cash, doesn’t expect NOK and RIMM to survive in Android business. Bigger, better player can go under- Borders Books failed, BKS will be next. Any time you’ve seen a stock that has moved a lot, and you say, “I missed it.” Instead, stop and do your work, pretend like it never was at a price before. Only thing that matters is where the stock is today and where it’s likely to be in the future.
Two types of shorts: both very tough. Where is it on the life cycle? Broken momentum shorts. Value traps. Best Buy (BBY): value trap, or say it’s trading at 8x FCF?
Q&A Session:
On Hedge Fund Management Fees & Investor Expectations: If you’re having a ballet in an auditorium, that’s fine, as long as you say that outside. If it’s a rock concert, that’s fine too, as long as you’ve labeled it as such. The problem is when you say it’s a ballet and it’s a rock concert. Make investors aware of exactly what your style is. He’s more volatile than the average hedge fund, so they communicate with their clients frequently. Had only single digit redemptions last year, up 12% so far this year. Manages ~$150 million: if he thought cutting fees would get him to $1B, he would do it. The money chases performance regardless of fees anyway. No clever fee arrangement works anyway.
For the rest of the notes from the CIMA Conference, head to these posts:
- Dan Loeb: Lessons He's Learned as an Investor
- David Einhorn Question & Answer Session
- Bruce Berkowitz's Basic Checklist for Investing & What He's Learned
- Distressed Investing Panel (Dan Loeb & Daniel Krueger)
- Bill Miller on What Stocks He Likes Now
- Michael Karsch on Risk Management
- Bruce Greenwald's Market Comments
Michael Karsch on Risk Management: CIMA Conference
Continuing the series of notes from the CIMA Conference (Columbia Investment Management Association), we present Karsch Capital's Michael Karsch talking about risk.
Michael Karsch on Risk Management
Gross exposure is more important than net exposure. When you’re not exposed enough, cut your least conviction shorts. When you’re too long, instead of shorting more, cut your least conviction longs.
Sometimes it’s dangerous to be near other hedge funds. Manage your gross carefully, not just your net. Hedge fund stocks did a lot worse than the market in 2008, so you got hurt both long and short. Just by shorting, more gross, less net, was actually higher risk. He did 100% over last ten years vs. SPX 12% over same time.
For the rest of the notes from the CIMA Conference, head to these posts:
- Dan Loeb: Lessons He's Learned as an Investor
- David Einhorn Question & Answer Session
- Bruce Berkowitz's Basic Checklist for Investing & What He's Learned
- Distressed Investing Panel (Dan Loeb & Daniel Krueger)
- Long/Short Equity Investing Panel (Whitney Tilson)
- Bill Miller on What Stocks He Likes Now
- Bruce Greenwald's Market Comments
Wednesday, March 28, 2012
Notes From the CIMA Conference 2012
Last month, numerous hedge fund managers gathered at the Columbia Student Investment Management Association (CIMA) Conference. This event focused less on specific stock picks and more on stock process, which we thought readers would find very useful.
Continuing to compile a compendium of timeless educational material here at Market Folly, today and tomorrow we'll be presenting a series of posts from the conference:
- Dan Loeb: Lessons He's Learned as an Investor
- David Einhorn Question & Answer Session
- Distressed Investing Panel (Dan Loeb & Daniel Krueger)
- Bruce Berkowitz's Basic Checklist for Investing & What He's Learned
- Long/Short Equity Investing Panel (Whitney Tilson)
- Bill Miller on What Stocks He Likes Now
- Michael Karsch on Risk Management
- Bruce Greenwald's Market Comments
Distressed Investing Panel: Dan Loeb & Daniel Krueger (CIMA Conference)
Continuing the series of notes from the CIMA conference (Columbia Investment Management Association), we turn to the distressed investing panel with some featured comments from Third Point's Dan Loeb and Owl Creek Asset Management's Daniel Krueger as well as some answers from Bruce Berkowitz (Fairholme Capital).
Distressed Investing Panel
Dan Loeb's Comments: Distressed investing applies to a process in securities that are not performing, it starts with a valuation of the enterprise- they buy anywhere in the capital structure. When they find one they like, they “jump in with both feet.”
In Q4 last year, it seemed that the concerns about the Europe crisis were well discounted in the market, and the US data was getting better. As January progressed, tail risk appeared off the table, and valuations of stocks were cheap. Administration realized that either beating up on the banks, or allowing them to grow, it was better to let them grow.
He got much more bullish in Jan, especially financials (Third Point has increased net long exposure). Bought Unicredito rights. Tech is ridiculously cheap- owns AAPL, GOOG, CSCO. “I’ve made more money going with the along with the crowd than against it.” Still maintain shorts, exposure went from 20% to 40% net long. Still long-tail hedges in case they’re wrong. Portuguese debt looks cheap. You can see Loeb's rationale for owning UniCredit and more in Third Point's investor letter.
Daniel Krueger's Comments: Besides just valuation, they look at each situation totally differently. Most situations require different skills than just valuation.
In distressed, you don’t need to know what is going to happen, for example, no one would have predicted with certainty that MF global was going to happen. You wait for situations to emerge. WAMU is an example- anyway that was an expert on WAMU the day before it was seized by the FDIC knew nothing now, it was all changed.
Distressed in Europe? 3% default rate vs. 2% in US. US high yield market current prices implies 7% default rate in the US over the next 5 years. (This seems ridiculously high). Europe has different rules than the US Chapter 11 rules. Look at process, not just outcome. Distressed is very binary. Your investment in Fannie for example at 5 cents on the dollar could go to zero. Assuming that is a bad decision may be wrong, if your process is right. The upside to these deals could be 20x, so don’t just look at outcome to decide if it was right or not, win or lose.
Idea: Seat Pagine Gialle SpA in Italy, yellow pages company. Been crushed all year, easy to hate yellow pages business, but has 40% EBITDA margins, no CAPEX, true monopoly, cheap price. Enough FCF over 4 years to repay the entire capital structure.
Bruce Berkowitz's Comments: “Shows you what kind of year I had last year, I didn’t think I WAS a distressed investor!” We often underestimate how important the price you pay for an investment; it may be 50-75% of the investment process, what price you pay for it.
Q&A Session:
1. Chrysler situation does not affect how they invest today.
2. How has Loeb’s process evolved? Started out in a single office, by himself, trying to raise money early, picked stocks during the day, and did bookkeeping at night. Now he has a 60 person staff, he has had to create an organization. Totally transparent, totally collaborative, defined investment framework. Research process defined. Learning turns on his team. He likes “high performance activity” like skiing, surfing, ran a triathlon. Something youthful about it. Had former CIA agents teach them deception detection. Always learning. It will naturally find itself into your investment process.
3. Tail hedges? About 50-100 bp of overall fund, that would have 10-20-30x payoffs if they materialize. Out of money calls on oil, for example, used to hedge against war in Iraq. Australian dollar put options, hedge against things slowing down in China.
4. When do they cut their losses? Berkowitz says if the facts tell you you’re right but the price tells you you’re wrong, you give yourself a lot of time. He basically never uses stops, he goes for years. Ask yourself “what am I missing?” Krueger says same thing – has never cut losses. Loeb: we may realize management is not as good as we thought, in case of YHOO, we try to change their behavior, or we just move on. Earnings misses- when stock falls, is the value impaired or our analysis was wrong. He sells at a loss often.
For the rest of the notes from the CIMA Conference, head to these posts:
- Dan Loeb: Lessons He's Learned as an Investor
- David Einhorn Question & Answer Session
- Bruce Berkowitz's Basic Checklist for Investing & What He's Learned Now
- Long/Short Equity Investing Panel (Whitney Tilson)
- Bill Miller on What Stocks He Likes Now
- Michael Karsch on Risk Management
- Bruce Greenwald's Market Comments
Lessons Dan Loeb Has Learned As An Investor: CIMA Conference
Continuing the series of notes from the CIMA conference (Columbia Investment Management Association), we move on to comments from Third Point founder Dan Loeb on lessons he's learned, value investing, and risk management.
What Dan Loeb Has Learned As An Investor
1. His style of investing has evolved and adapted to the investment environment, his process has evolved significantly. Importance of process itself on running an investment management firm. Leadership is very important. Most firms fail from dysfunctional process, or leadership of the firm.
2. Areas of focus and interest: if spending all your time reading research reports and only looking at screen, you will fail. Be well-rounded, travel, study things outside of the narrow topics of finance. If investing was just about numbers, any young accountant could do this. More than industry analysis, need to understand why you make decision, when it’s right to be contrary, when its not. Santa Fe institute has good ideas.
3. Importance in today’s world of political analysis. You can be right about financials, but if you don’t understand what the next move is by our politicians, you can get it wrong.
4. Looking at portfolios, think deeply about process over outcome. If you do something the right way enough times, you’ll win. Look at risk in an intelligent way, look at Alpha generation, not just how much money you make.
On Value Investing: Let's not delude ourselves; some of us are just buying really crappy companies at low prices. Don't make excuses for making bad investments at apparently cheap valuations. He'd rather pay up for a better business that has some growth.
On Managing Risk: He was down 30% in 2008, went from 6B in assets to 1.4B in assets, so he knows that everyone says they’re long term investors, but they still don’t want to lose money in any given year. He’s back up to 9B in assets now. He doesn’t want to lose money in any given year. Tries to have things in different sectors, and asset classes. Has 1.8B mortgage portfolio now for example. Uses tail-risk hedges, and shorts to hedge risk. To have a sustainable, growing business, managing volatility is important.
On “Stinky Feet Stocks”: When your first reaction to a pitch is that’s a terrible stock or industry, those have often been some of their best investments. He considers that a positive when it’s something in an out of favor industry. Auto parts in 2009, European banks in beginning of this year.
They use private investigators on shorts, to know the situation better than the rest of the world. Be sure to also check out Dan Loeb's recommended reading list.
For the rest of the notes from the CIMA Conference, head to these posts:
- David Einhorn Question & Answer Session
- Distressed Investing Panel (Dan Loeb & Daniel Krueger)
- Bruce Berkowitz's Basic Checklist for Investing & What He's Learned
- Long/Short Equity Investing Panel (Whitney Tilson)
- Bill Miller on What Stocks He Likes Now
- Michael Karsch on Risk Management
- Bruce Greenwald's Market Comments
David Einhorn's Extensive Q&A Session from the CIMA Conference
Continuing the series of notes from the CIMA conference (Columbia Investment Management Association), we move on to the portion with Greenlight Capital's David Einhorn. He did his entire session in question and answer format.
David Einhorn's Q&A Session (CIMA Conference)
1. How do you look for ideas on a day-to-day basis? No method for doing it. We are looking for situations where we think something is mispriced. We start with a story, a thesis of why it’s misvalued. There is no systematic way to do this; it’s like going to a bookstore to browse for books. We don’t start with “is it cheap?” That’s easy to find on the computer, but we view cheap as secondary situation. Our goal is weed out as many things as fast as we can.
Example? Process is lack of a process. Sometimes an analyst generates the idea, sometimes other fund managers, a conference, or an idea dinner. Market Folly note: you can also get a good look at Einhorn in action in his book: Fooling Some of the People All of the Time. Be sure to also check out Einhorn's recommended reading list.
2. Once you have an idea, what is your edge? We want to find out what the misunderstanding is. Sometimes it’s a conspiracy to misinform people. Wall Street has this agenda. We like to identify something in which the public has been misinformed. How do you know you’re right? That’s what the work is. We find out what everyone thinks, and then what we think, and then we test it. What we need to know to convince ourselves that we understand it. Fairly informal process, not a firm checklist.
3. Where do you see the most promise today- an example? Long first: large position in AAPL. What could we possibly figure out that not every other person on the planet could figure out? Come to the view that large cap stocks have the same efficiencies as small cap stocks if you take a step back. Compare to KO a decade ago, selling bottlers to make earnings, and it was a high multiple stock. We didn’t short it because, we thought, “What could we possibly know about coke?” KO then declined like crazy- we realized we were making a big mistake by ignoring large companies with large inefficiencies.
What is the inefficiency at AAPL? It trades at a low multiple because people have seen the history of hardware companies, such as the Motorola RAZR, which has been learned. Issue with AAPL is it started with the iPod, got all your music. Now you have the music on your iPhone. TV, iPad, photos. Once you have an Apple device, you buy a second. You become an “Apple customer.” You’re not going to choose your next phone by it being 5% better than the iPhone5. Most people will just go buy the new iPhone5. It’s not a one-time hardware sale; you need a new one every 2 years. They simply wear out, it’s not just to get better phone. Market thinks it’s a hardware company that could lose its edge. Instead, it’s a growth, recurring revenue business that the market has refused to award it. The majority of market practitioners misunderstand it. Bought at 60, sold at 80. Watched, watched, and bought back at 240.
4. More on AAPL: TVs with low margins. Answer: (Note that AAPL shares have jumped 25% since he made these comments) At this valuation, you are not paying for TV at all. You’re not even paying for the current business. $390 per share for business ex cash, earn $45, getting it at 8x p/e. Grew rev at 70% last year, still penetrating the world on early stage iPads, geographically still penetrating for iPhone, especially in China. Even on a bad day, that multiple should be more than a premium of the market. Best company on the market, and trading for half the market premium. Room for value destruction at this price. Never done big acquisitions, R&D expenditure is tight, CAPEX is smart. On TVs: they’ll have to revolutionize the TV like they have the iPhone. Otherwise, they won’t do it. The cable companies might even subsidize the TV. But you don’t have to be right about the TV to make money on the stock.
5. Risk/position sizing? He doesn’t believe in any of the quantitative measures of risk- instead the common sense of risk- how much can you lose? How quickly can you get out of a position? Never bet the whole firm on one position. Large long position is small double digits. Short position smaller, because of upside risk.
6. On poker: skills are somewhat related, you have some information you can see for sure, and some you can deduce, and then you have the future which is a range of possible outcomes. You try to optimize it based on all these factors. In the past, we've highlighted the growing number of hedge fund managers that play poker.
7. Japan- still in trouble, out of the money options are mispriced because people pricing them are using VAR, which is fundamentally flawed.
8. Gold: how do you value it? He is long a lot of gold, has been for a few years, since the financial crisis. Moved all the problems from the private sector to the public sector, which will have an effect on the currency. Gold is money; you don’t value it for its use as a productive commodity. This money only grows at 1-2% per year and the other kind of money changes whenever the central banks decide they need to lend the banks a trillion euros. Policies being pursued now are fraught with risk. Makes sense to have a fraction of your assets that is not exposed to the consequences of their decisions.
Einhorn originally bought physical gold in 2009. Since then, he's also bought gold miners.
9. Emerging Markets? Don’t invest in emerging markets; not comfortable with accounting, risks.
10. Walgreens? Thought about being long WAG, due to fight with ESRX. Idea is they will make up eventually and the stock will pop higher. First, figured out they can’t get any edge on whether they work it out or not. Now they think that since WAG customers can’t use ESRX, it is already a permanent loss for WAG because they may change already. Compromise will still be a lower price per prescription, so everyone else will want the same deal as ESRX gets with WAG. Caremark could demand the same deal since ESRX did. Believe it will be a more sustained, permanent impairment of earnings.
11. Why doesn’t Android win? AAPL has high switching costs. They don’t have a lifetime guaranteed annuity, what they have is a happy, loyal customer. Most of the time these types of franchises have 20-30x multiples, but it’s being priced as a deteriorating business, which it’s not.
12. Fed Balance Sheet: He can’t figure out what the implications of the increased fed balance sheet means, and he doesn’t need to for holding his longs. We’re not going to know what could go wrong, it’s almost certain to be something we don’t think it will be. The fed chairman is a “fanatic” who is living out his academic thesis. We could have a real problem on the way out.
13. New York Mets: of all of his investments, he thought for sure this was the most certain to be negative risk-adjusted return, which made it so irritating that he couldn’t do it.
14. Research in Motion (RIMM): has problems, but could be an interesting long (Einhorn established a new long position in RIMM in Q4 2011). Critical mass for app developers, and they may have missed it. Has a good B/S, trades at a low multiple, and has some IP that a lot of tech companies would want. Trades on a run-off basis, it’s a reasonable speculation that it won’t melt. Not a fantastic investment, but the price has come down so far, that it makes no sense to short it.
15. Shorting GMCR and being public about it - do you have confidence in the SEC? He has no confidence in the SEC. There are about 20 or 30 ways he can win on the GMCR short, but SEC is not on the top of the list. Accounting practices are rather blatant and obvious that the SEC should do something about it, but they don’t look likely to do anything.
If you haven't seen it yet, you can view Einhorn's short case on Green Mountain Coffee Roasters (GMCR).
16. Time arbitrage: he thinks their time horizons of 1-3 years is longer than most market active participants. Most hedge funds under 6 months, long only 6-12 months. Don’t want to hold things that could be in half before it works. But don’t say “dead money” because it could move when you least expect it.
MF note: Blue Ridge Capital's John Griffin has often classified investments as time arbitrage or catalyst driven. Joel Greenblatt's Gotham Capital also utilizes time arbitrage as part of its investment strategy.
17. Long DELL: AAPL is much better than DELL, but DELL has been a great business innovator. They were lousy capital allocators, bought back stock at 40-50x earnings. Then once the stock collapsed, they bought businesses at high multiples instead. In the middle of 2011, they woke up and started buying back stock cheap. They haven’t made any bad acquisitions lately either. $15 stock, $7 per share, $2 EPS, getting stock at 4x P/E even if they’re not growing fast. If they use part of the $7 to buy back stock, you could win. Misunderstanding is at least half of their business is not PCs or notebooks. If you put 8x p/e on other stuff, you get the PC business for free. You can see further thoughts on DELL in Einhorn's investor letter.
18. Industries he won’t touch? He learned to never say never. Six months before he bought gold, he said never to buy gold. His mind can change at times. Betting on outcome of clinical trials is very challenging, and he has no expertise. But he still won’t rule it out. He never would have a large allocation in technology 11 years ago. Time and place for everything just recognize which areas are harder for you.
19. Economics is not a science, it’s an art. He’s very critical of it, people make some very bad conclusions that have had awful consequences for our society. Winning Nobel prizes, but enacting their views as if their science instead of art, have had huge negative consequences.
20. Online gaming? He has no idea how it will sort out. If it opens up, it will be very competitive.
21. St. Joe (JOE): concept stock runs into a math problem. You know exactly what the values are today, because you have transactions and you know what the value is. They can’t create value through actively managing. All they can do is reduce the amount of value that’s being destroyed every day. Land worth $7, stock worth $14. not levered, but it’s also good that it can’t rocket up either. Only way it works is if they discover oil, and his diligence says they’ve already looked.
If you haven't seen it, check out Einhorn's short thesis on JOE.
22. Commodities business? Very hard- need to figure out the normal price of the company, and see if the business is value added or subtractive, and then see if the business is cheap. So when the prices swing quick, you can get hurt badly. You need to have an insight on which way the commodity price will go.
For the rest of the notes from the CIMA Conference, head to these posts:
- Dan Loeb: Lessons He's Learned as an Investor
- Distressed Investing Panel (Dan Loeb & Daniel Krueger)
- Bruce Berkowitz's Basic Checklist for Investing & What He's Learned
- Long/Short Equity Investing Panel: Whitney Tilson
- Bill Miller on What Stocks He Likes Now
- Michael Karsch on Risk Management
- Bruce Greenwald's Market Comments
Bruce Greenwald on the Market: CIMA Conference
Continuing the series of notes from the CIMA conference (Columbia Investment Management Association), we present Bruce Greenwald's introductory comments. Greenwald is the Robert Heilbrunn Professor of Finance & Asset Management at Columbia Business School.
Bruce Greenwald's Introductory Comments
1. Apocalyptic viewpoint is almost never justified. At the absolute worst, it will be a decline of 1-2% in economic activity, much less than the 5-8% in 2009. (Not true of Greece & Portugal).
2. Through the crisis, corporate profits other than financial sector have been extraordinary. Even Deere & CAT had profit declines of 40-50%, but no losses.
3. Securities are not grossly mispriced if you look at growth expectations. 8-12% likely stock moves based on operating earnings. No bubble in stocks. 3% on 30-year government bonds, with no inflation protection, seems risky.
For the rest of the notes from the CIMA Conference, head to these posts:
- Dan Loeb: Lessons He's Learned as an Investor
- David Einhorn Question & Answer Session
- Distressed Investing Panel (Dan Loeb & Daniel Krueger)
- Bruce Berkowitz's Basic Checklist for Investing & What He's Learned
- Long/Short Equity Investing Panel (Whitney Tilson)
- Bill Miller on What Stocks He Likes Now
- Michael Karsch on Risk Management