Bill Gross on How To Be a Better Investor: PIMCO Investment Outlook

PIMCO's Bill Gross is out with his monthly investment outlook for April.  Entitled "A Man in the Mirror," Gross examines himself as a market participant and provides wisdom by outlaying how others can learn from his mistakes.

One interesting part he raises is how all investors of this generation have benefited from a period of credit expansion.  He writes,

"But let me admit something. There is not a Bond King or a Stock King or an Investor Sovereign alive that can claim title to a throne. All of us, even the old guys like Buffett, Soros, Fuss, yeah – me too, have cut our teeth during perhaps a most advantageous period of time, the most attractive epoch, that an investor could experience."

Later, he goes on to emphasize how investors may be forced to adapt and to make a change, an important thing to keep in mind as we approach the potential of a rising interest rate environment in the future.

Embedded below is Bill Gross' April commentary:




You can download a .pdf copy here.

For more from this bond kingpin, head to Gross' previous investment outlook: rational temperance.

Bill Gross' Latest Investment Outlook: Rational Temperance

It's been a while since we've checked in on what the bond king Bill Gross is up to over at PIMCO, so below is his latest investment outlook entitled 'Rational Temperance'.

In it, he touches on how investors are stretching for yield and that "corporate credit and high yield bonds are somewhat exuberantly and irrationally priced.  Spreads are tight, corporate profit margins are at record paeks with room to fall, and the economy is still fragile.  Still that doesn't mean you should vacate your portfolio of them.  It just implies that recent double-digit returns are unlikely to be replicated."

Oaktree Capital's Howard Marks also recently commented on high yield bonds in his latest memo.

Gross then goes on to say that, "the conclusion would be that where high yield prices go, stock markets follow, or vice versa.  Narrow yield spreads in high yield credit markets appear to be accompanied by 'narrow' equity risk premiums in the market for stocks, which is another way of saying that the course of future equity returns may not resemble its recent exuberant past."

Basically, the whole theme of Gross' piece "Rational Temperance" is him saying that investors should lower their return expectations.

Embedded below is Bill Gross' latest PIMCO investment outlook:




You can download a .pdf copy here.

Bill Gross on the Death of Equities: PIMCO Investment Outlook

PIMCO's Bill Gross is out with his latest market commentary entitled "Cult Figures" where he essentially claims stocks are dead:  "The cult of equity is dying."

Before reading his latest missive, it's worth noting his inherent conflict of interest: he's at one of the largest fixed income managers out there (of course he would love it if equities were dead and billions in AUM flowed to fixed income managers).

While some may argue his call as a contrarian signal to buy equities, you have to consider that such a call would be a clearer signal if an *equity* investor was staking such a claim.  Capitulation, a shangri-la for contrarians, can't truly come to fruition until the most ardent defenders throw in the towel.

However, one other conclusion from his note is evident regarding inflation.  He writes, "Unfair though it may be, an investor should continue to expect an attempted inflationary solution in almost all developed countries over the next few years and even decades." 

Obviously, he argues investors need to prepare for such an environment and we've posted up the best investments for inflation before (as well as the best investments for deflation for those in the other camp).

At any rate, you can read Bill Gross' latest market commentary embedded below (and download a .pdf here):





For more commentary from the PIMCO man, check out his piece on how to generate returns in a low yield environment.

PIMCO's Bill Gross: How To Generate Returns in Low Yield Environment

PIMCO's bond vigilante in chief, Bill Gross, is out with some pertinent commentary addressing how investors can generate returns in a low yield environment while still keeping risk reduced.

Given that the Federal Reserve has signaled they'll keep rates low until mid-2013, Gross lays out a playbook in his April investment outlook entitled, The Great Escape: Delivering in a Delevering World.

Bill Gross' Advice

"When interest rates cannot be dramatically lowered further or risk spreads significantly compressed, the momentum begins to shift, not necessarily suddenly, but gradually - yields moving mildly higher and spreads stabilizing or moving slightly wider..

In such a mildly reflating world, unless you want to earn an inflation-adjusted return of minus 2%-3% as offered by Treasury bills, then you must take risk in some form.

We favor high quality, shorter duration and inflation-protected bonds; dividend paying stocks with a preference for developing over developed markets; and inflation-sensitive, supply-constrained commodity products" (emphasis ours).


Gross then goes on to break down specific plays in each asset class, writing:

"For bond markets: favor higher quality, shorter duration and inflation protected assets

For stocks: favor developing vs. developed. Favor shorter durations here too, which means consistent dividend paying as opposed to growth stocks.

For commodities: favor inflation sensitive, supply constrained products.

And for all asset categories: be wary of levered hedge strategies that promise double-digit returns that are difficult in a delevering world."


Bill Gross' entire April market commentary is embedded below:




If you missed his last note, we've also posted up Bill Gross' investment outlook: defense.

For a somewhat related macro/econ post, head to Bridgewater's Ray Dalio on deleveragings.

Bill Gross' Investment Outlook: Defense

PIMCO's Bill Gross is out with his latest 2012 investment outlook, entitled "Defense." Given all the equity commentary on the site lately, we thought we'd add some fixed income color.

In his commentary, Gross outlines the core tenets of PIMCO's "offense" from 1981 to 2011. Now, from 2012 onwards, Gross says that "successful investing in a deleveraging, low interest rate environment will require defensive in addition to offensive skills."

To learn what exactly that means, here is Gross' entire commentary below:

• ​Over the past 30 years, an offensively minded Federal Reserve and their global counterparts were printing money, lowering yields and bringing forward a false sense of monetary wealth.
• Successful investing in a deleveraging, low interest rate environment will require defensive in addition to offensive skills.
• The PIMCO defensive strategy playbook: Recognize zero bound limits and systemic debt risk in global financial markets. Accept financial repression but avoid its impact when and where possible. Emphasize income we believe to be relatively reliable/safe; seek consistent alpha.

They say defense wins Super Bowls, but the Mannings, Bradys and Montanas of gridiron history are testaments to the opposite. Putting points on the board, especially in the last two minutes, has won more games than goal line stands ever have, even if the scoring has been done by the field goal kickers, the names of whom have been confined to the dustbins of football history as opposed to the Hall of Fame in Canton, Ohio. Canton, however, has an approximately equal number of defensive in addition to offensively positioned inductees, so there must be a universally acknowledged role for both sides of the scrimmage line. What fan can forget Mean Joe Greene, Deion Sanders or Dick Butkus? The old, now politically incorrect showtune laments that “you gotta be a football hero, to fall in love with a beautiful girl,” but football and any of life’s heroes can play on either side of the line, it seems.

My point about pigskin offense and defense is the perfect metaphor for the world of investing as well. Offensively minded risk takers in the markets have historically been the ones who have dominated the headlines and won the hearts of that beautiful gal (or handsome guy). Aside from the rare examples of Steve Jobs and Bill Gates, however, the secret to getting rich since the early 1980s has been to borrow someone else’s money, throw some Hail Mary passes and spike the ball in the end zone as if you had some particular genius that deserved monetary rewards 2¹⁰ times more than a Doctor, Lawyer or an Indian Chief. Nah, I take that back about the Indian Chief. The Chiefs, at least, have done pretty well with casinos these past few decades.

Still, the primary way to coin money over the past 30 years has been to use money to make money. Although the price of it started in 1981 at a rather exorbitantly high yield of 15% for long-term Treasuries, 20% for the prime, and real interest rates at an almost unbelievable 7-8%, the gradual decline of yields over the past three decades has allowed P/E ratios, real estate prices and bond fund NAVs to expand on a seemingly endless virtuous timeline. Books such as “Stocks for the Long Run” or articles such as “Dow 36,000” captured the public’s imagination much like a Montana to Jerry Rice pass that always seemed to clinch a 49ers victory. Yet an instant replay of these past few decades would have shown that accelerating asset prices weren’t due to any particular wisdom on the part of academia or the investment community but an offensively minded Federal Reserve and their global counterparts who were printing money, lowering yields and bringing forward a false sense of monetary wealth that was dependent on perpetual motion. “Rinse, lather, repeat – Rinse, lather, repeat” was in effect the singular mantra of central bankers ever since the departure of Paul Volcker, but there was no sense that the shampoo bottle filled with money would ever run dry. Well, it has. Interest rates have a mathematical bottom and when they get there, the washing of the financial market’s hair produces a lot less lather when it’s wet, and a lot less body after the blow dry. At the zero bound, not only are yields rendered impotent to elevate P/E ratios and lower real estate cap rates, but they begin to poison the financial well. Low yields, instead of fostering capital gains for investors via the magic of present value discounting and lower credit spreads, begin to reduce household incomes, lower corporate profit margins and wreak havoc on historical business models connected to banking, money market funds and the pension industry. The offensively oriented investment world that we have grown so used to over the past three decades is being stonewalled by a zero bound goal line stand. Investment defense is coming of age.

This transition is not commonly observed, although it is relatively easy to prove statistically and even commonsensically. Take for instance the rather quizzical notion that lower yields must produce an equal number of winners and losers since there is a borrower for every lender and the net/net therefore should have no effect on the real economy or its financial markets. Chart 1 shows that since 1981, which marks the beginning of the secular decline of interest rates, personal interest income has rather gradually (and now somewhat suddenly) shrunk relative to household debt service payments.

It is Main Street that has failed to keep up with Wall Street and corporate America in the race to see who can benefit more from lower yields. As the interest component of personal income gradually weakens, the ability of the consumer to keep up its frenetic spending is reduced. Metaphorically, it’s akin to a 4th quarter two minute Super Bowl drill, but one where the receivers haven’t been properly hydrated. They’re a half step slow, their legs are cramping, and it shows. Lower interest rates are having a negative impact on households because their water bottles are filled with 50 basis point CDs instead of Gatorade.

While Wall Street and levered investors have fared better than their Main Street counterparts, it’s not as if they’re in “primetime Deion Sanders” shape either. Conceptualize the historical business model of any financially-oriented firm for the past 30 years and you will see what I mean. Insurance companies, for instance, whether they be life insurance with their long-term liabilities, or property/casualty insurance with more immediate potential payouts, have modeled their long-term profitability on the assumption of standard long-term real returns on investment. AFLAC, GEICO, Prudential or the Met – take your pick – have hired, staffed, advertised, priced and expensed based upon the assumption of using their cash flows to earn a positive real return on their investment. When those returns fall from 7% positive to an approximate 1% negative, then assumptions – and practical realities – begin to change. If these firms can’t cover inflation with historical real returns from their float, then they begin to downsize in order to stay profitable. The downsizing is just another way of describing a transition from offense to defense in a zero bound nominal interest rate world where almost any level of inflation produces negative real yields on investment.

Not only insurance companies but banks suffer from this inability to maintain margins at the zero bound. In the process, they close retail branches that once were assumed to be the golden key to successful banking. Defense! And here’s one of the more interesting anecdotal observations on our current zero-based environment, one to which my investment paragon – Warren Buffett – would probably immediately admit. His business model – and that of Berkshire Hathaway – has long benefitted from what he has described as “free float.” Those annual policy payments, whether for hurricane, life or automobile insurance, have long given him a competitive funding advantage over other business models that couldn’t borrow for “free.” Today, however, almost any large business or wealthy individual can borrow or lever up with minimal interest expense. Buffett’s “Omaha/West Coast” offense is being duplicated around the world thanks to central bank monetary policies, placing an increasing emphasis on stock and investment selection as opposed to business model liability funding. Buffett will succeed based upon his continued strong offensive play calling, but the rules of the game are changing.

The plight of Buffett of course is in some respects the plight of PIMCO or any investment/financially-oriented firm in this new age of the zero bound. And it seems to us at PIMCO that successful investing in a deleveraging, low interest rate environment will require defensive in addition to offensive skills. What does that mean? Well, let’s briefly describe PIMCO’s own historical investment offense for the past 30 years in order to provide a defensivecontrast:

PIMCO Offensive Strategy 1981 – 2011

Ready, Set, Hut 1, Hut 2 –

1. Recognize downward trend in interest rates and scale duration accordingly.
   
   A. Emphasize income and capital gains. PIMCO Total Return Strategy.
   B. Utilize prudent derivative structures that benefit from systemic leveraging – financial futures,
   swaps (but no subprimes!)
   C. Combine A and B along with careful bottom-up security selection to seek consistent alpha.
   

PIMCO Defensive Strategy 2012 – ?

Ready, Set, Hut, Hut, Hut –

1. Recognize zero bound limits and systemic debt risk in global financial markets. Accept financial repression but avoid its impact when and where possible.
   
   A. Emphasize income we believe to be relatively reliable/safe.
   B. De-emphasize derivative structures that are fully valued and potentially volatile.
   C. Combine A and B along with security selection to seek consistent alpha with admittedly lower nominal returns than historical industry examples.
   

So there you have it – the PIMCO playbook. I suppose if I had any common sense I would hold up that clipboard to the front of my mouth like sideline coaches do during big games. Don’t want to chance any of the competition reading our lips to get a heads up on PIMCO’s next offensive play call. But then that’s never been my or Mohamed’s style, given the importance of informing you, our clients, of what we are thinking when it comes to investing your hard-earned capital. Go ahead competitors and read our lips, we’ll just pound that pigskin down the field anyway. Besides, as I’ve pointed out, the emphasis these days should be on the defensive coach. Leveraging has turned into deleveraging. 15% yields have turned into 0% money. The Super Bowls of the future will have their Mannings and Bradys, but the defensive line may record more sacks and make more headlines than ever before.

William H. Gross

Managing Director
Source: PIMCO

For other market commentary, we've posted up Jeremy Grantham's 10 investment lessons as well as Oaktree Capital and Howard Marks' latest letter.

PIMCO's Bill Gross: August Investment Outlook 2010

We're continuing our 'market-strategist-Monday' here on Market Folly and next up is PIMCO's Bill Gross. It's been a few months since we last covered his thoughts so we thought we'd check-in on the bond king. Last time we noted how he favored quality credit over duration extension. This time around, Gross is talking less about particular markets and more about the macro big picture and how it associates to PIMCO's 'new normal' thesis. Earlier in our morning market strategy coverage, we highlighted the commentary from GMO's Jeremy Grantham where we found he favored high quality US stocks.

Gross begins his missive on the topic of toilets but bear with him as he has an actual message behind that. And, it has to do with PIMCO's thesis of 'new normal.' Gross argues that not only growth, but capitalism as well, are dependent on a growing population (at least in part). He then writes that, "the danger today, as opposed to prior deleveraging cycles, is that the deleveraging is being attempted into the headwinds of a structural demographic downwave as opposed to a decade of substantial population growth." He then cites Japan as a modern-day example of this.

Gross also writes, "PIMCO's continuing New Normal thesis of deleveraging, reregulation, and deglobalization produces structural headwinds that lead to lower economic growth as well as half-sized asset returns when compared to historical averages. The New Normal will not be aided nor abetted by a slower-growing populatio nor by cyclical policy errors that thrust Keynesian consumption remedies on a declining consumer base."

In short, the PIMCO bond vigilante feels that current deficit spending is not the way to go and is akin to flushing money down the toilet (now you get the toilet reference he made earlier). Instead, Gross favors industrial policies aimed at strengthening infrastructure, clean energy, education, and healthcare. Gross is not alone in his stance as Oaktree Capital's Howard Marks has also voiced frustration with the government as well.

Embedded below is the August 2010 investment outlook from PIMCO's Bill Gross:



You can download a .pdf copy here.

Continuing our 'market-strategist-Monday', make sure to also check out Jeremy Grantham's latest commentary from GMO. And for some of Bill Gross' past commentary, you can view his thoughts on how he favors quality credit over duration extension.

PIMCO's Bill Gross Favors Quality Credit Spread Over Duration Extension (April 2010 Commentary)

Today we wanted to highlight the latest investment outlook from PIMCO's bond vigilante himself, Bill Gross. In his past March commentary, Gross focused on corporate versus sovereign bonds. His April commentary is entitled 'Rocking-Horse Winner' and it centers on American capitalism and how it is driven by printing, lending and borrowing money in order to make more money. Gross immediately notes that we face an environment with lower growth due to headwinds in deleveraging, deglobalization, and reregulation. Gross of course recently landed on Forbes' billionaire list, joining many prestigious investment managers.

The crux of Gross' message this time around comes later in his insight where he writes,

"The reason is complicated, but at its core very simple. As a November IMF staff position note aptly pointed out, high fiscal deficits and higher outstanding debt lead to higher real interest rates and ultimately higher inflation, both trends which are bond market unfriendly. In the U.S. in addition to the 10% of GDP deficits and a growing stock of outstanding debt, an investor must be concerned with future unfunded entitlement commitments which portfolio managers almost always neglect, viewing them as so far off in the future that they don’t matter. Yet should it concern an investor in 30-year Treasuries that the Congressional Budget Office estimates that the present value of unfunded future social insurance expenditures (Social Security and Medicare primarily) was $46 trillion as of 2009, a sum four times its current outstanding debt? Of course it should, and that may be a primary reason why 30-year bonds yield 4.6% whereas 2-year debt with the same guarantee yields less than 1%. The trend promises to get worse, not better."

Elaborating further on his thoughts, it's clear that Gross favors quality credit spread over duration. He argues that investment strategies should start to position themselves on the front-end of various yield curves that are subject to successful reflation. He specifically highlights the US and Brazil here. He also recommends positioning on the long end of curves that can survive debt deflation (namely Germany and most of the solid European nations).

Lastly, Bill Gross notes that, "Spreads in appropriate sovereign and corporate credits are a better bet as long as global contagion is contained. If not, a rush to the safety of Treasury Bills lies ahead." You can directly download Bill Gross' entire April 2010 investment outlook via .pdf here.

Interesting thoughts as always from PIMCO's bond vigilante and we'll continue to check in with him each month. You can also check out his March commentary as well as our compilation of investment insight from various gurus.

PIMCO's Bill Gross On Corporate Versus Sovereign Bonds: March Commentary

Bill Gross is out with his latest commentary from PIMCO. In his March 2010 investment outlook entitled 'Don't Care', Gross focuses on the lack of global aggregate demand and how we got into this whole situation. The first part of his commentary doesn't really focus on markets, but rather on social situations. It is still comical (and shockingly somewhat true) and eventually ties into his market discussion, providing a decent analogy. Previously, we've also posted Gross' previous outlook as well as his thoughts on why the market is up so much from the lows.

Given Gross' natural focus on all things fixed income, he comments on how sovereign bonds have been hit hard and as of late have even been surrounded with more negativity than corporate debt. With the recent wave of default concern, it's intriguing that the roles of these types of bonds have flipped. Previously, sovereign bonds were considered safer than corporates. Nowadays, investors are re-considering and some corporates now look safer than some sovereigns. In terms of recommendations, he likes strong sovereign bonds including Germany and Canada.

Gross writes,

"It is interesting to observe that over the past few months when investors have begun to question the ability of governments to exit the debt crisis by “creating more debt,” that increases in bond market yields have been confined almost exclusively to Treasury/Gilt-type securities, and long maturities at that. There has even been a developing debate in the press (and here at PIMCO) as to whether a highly-rated corporation could ever consistently trade at lower yields compared to its home country’s debt. I suspect not, but the narrowing in spreads since late November solicits an interesting proposition: Government bailouts and guarantees such as those evidenced and envisioned in Dubai and Greece, as well as those for the last 18 months with banks and large industrial corporations across the globe, suggest a more homogeneous “unicredit” type of bond market. If core sovereigns such as the U.S., Germany, U.K., and Japan “absorb” more and more credit risk, then the credit spreads and yields of these sovereigns should look more and more like the markets that they guarantee. The Kings, in other words, in the process of increasingly shedding their clothes, begin to look more and more like their subjects. Kings and serfs begin to share the same castle.

This metaphor doesn’t really answer the critical question of whether a debt crisis can be cured by issuing more debt. The answer remains: It depends – on initial debt levels and whether or not private economies can be reinvigorated. But it does suggest the likely direction of sovereign yields IF global policymakers are successful with their rescue efforts: Sovereign yields will narrow in spreads compared to other high-quality alternatives. In other words, sovereign yields will become more credit like. When sovereign issues become more credit-like, as evidenced in Greece, Spain, Portugal, and a host of others, they move closer in yield to the corporate and Agency debt that supposedly rank lower in the hierarchy. That process of course can be accomplished in two ways: high-quality non-sovereigns move down to lower levels or governments move up. The answer to which one depends significantly on future inflation, the aftermath of quantitative easing programs, and the vigor of the private economy going forward. But the contamination of sovereign credit space with past and future bailouts is a leveler, a homogenizer, a negative for those sovereigns that fail to exert necessary discipline. Only if global economies stumble and revisit the recessionary depths of a year ago should the process reverse direction and place Treasuries, Gilts, et al. back in the driver’s seat."


To read the rest of Bill Gross' commentary, directly download it via .pdf here.

For more investment insight from market gurus, check out Warren Buffett's annual letter as well as Eddie Lampert's annual letter. Additionally, make sure to check out our past coverage of a ton of very insightful commentary from hedge funds.

Bill Gross' Market Outlook February 2010 (PIMCO)

Next up, we have Bill Gross' February 2010 market outlook. Today is 'wisdom Wednesday' (pardon the lame name) here at Market Folly as we have plenty of interesting reads to share with you and earlier posted Bill Gates' 2010 annual letter. Moving on, Bill Gross of course is PIMCO's bond vigilante and in the past we had covered his thoughts on why the market is up so much from the lows.

His latest commentary entitled, "The Ring of Fire" focuses on how investors should invest in 'less levered countries'. In terms of identifying such countries, Gross says to look for a growing consumer sector, low national debt levels, a savings oriented economy, and high reserves. He advises investors to find countries like Brazil and China, but ones that are less bubble-prone. Specifically, he points out to avoid the UK as their high debt coupled with possible currency devaluation presents high risk. Among countries that are already developed, Gross favors Canada and Germany. His latest piece comes after his January commentary where he examined the Federal Reserve's exit strategy.

Embedded below you'll find the February 2010 market outlook from PIMCO's bond bandit Bill Gross:




Also, you can download the .pdf here.

For more insight, check out Bill Gross' January commentary, as well as his thoughts on how he was betting on deflation.

PIMCO's Bill Gross: January Outlook

Earlier this morning, we had a guest post that highlighted Bill Gross' simple explanation as to why the market is up so much from the lows. Now, we're shifting our focus to Bill Gross' monthly outlook. In his January 2010 note entitled 'Let's Get Fisical", the PIMCO bond vigilante delves into fiscal affairs. Here are some of his thoughts:

"Explaining the current state of global fiscal affairs is often confusing – it’s much like Robert Palmer’s 1980s classic song where he laments that “She’s so fine, there’s no telling where the money went!” Where government spending has gone is not always clear, but one thing is certain: public debt is soaring and most of it has come from G7 countries intent on stimulating their respective economies. Over the past two years their sovereign debt has climbed by roughly 20% of respective GDPs, yet that is not the full story. Some of governments’ mystery money showed up in sovereign budgets funded by debt sold to investors, but more of it showed up on central bank balance sheets as a result of check writing that required no money at all. The latter was 2009’s global innovation known as “quantitative easing,” where central banks and fiscal agents bought Treasuries, Gilts, and Euroland corporate “covered” bonds approaching two trillion dollars. It was the least understood, most surreptitious government bailout of all, far exceeding the U.S. TARP in magnitude. In the process, as shown in Chart 1, the Fed and the Bank of England (BOE) alone expanded their balance sheets (bought and guaranteed bonds) up to depressionary 1930s levels of nearly 20% of GDP. Theoretically, this could go on for some time, but the check writing is ultimately inflationary and central bankers don’t like to get saddled with collateral such as 30-year mortgages that reduce their maneuverability and represent potential maturity mismatches if interest rates go up. So if something can’t keep going, it stops – to paraphrase Herbert Stein – and 2010 will likely witness an attempted exit by the Fed at the end of March, and perhaps even the BOE later in the year.

Here’s the problem that the U.S. Fed’s “exit” poses in simple English: Our fiscal 2009 deficit totaled nearly 12% of GDP and required over $1.5 trillion of new debt to finance it. The Chinese bought a little ($100 billion) of that, other sovereign wealth funds bought some more, but as shown in Chart 2, foreign investors as a group bought only 20% of the total – perhaps $300 billion or so. The balance over the past 12 months was substantially purchased by the Federal Reserve. Of course they purchased more 30-year Agency mortgages than Treasuries, but PIMCO and others sold them those mortgages and bought – you guessed it – Treasuries with the proceeds. The conclusion of this fairytale is that the government got to run up a 1.5 trillion dollar deficit, didn’t have to sell much of it to private investors, and lived happily ever – ever – well, not ever after, but certainly in 2009. Now, however, the Fed tells us that they’re “fed up,” or that they think the economy is strong enough for them to gracefully “exit,” or that they’re confident that private investors are capable of absorbing the balance. Not likely. Various studies by the IMF, the Fed itself, and one in particular by Thomas Laubach, a former Fed economist, suggest that increases in budget deficits ultimately have interest rate consequences and that those countries with the highest current and projected deficits as a percentage of GDP will suffer the highest increases – perhaps as much as 25 basis points per 1% increase in projected deficits five years forward. If that calculation is anywhere close to reality, investors can guesstimate the potential consequences by using impartial IMF projections for major G7 country deficits as shown in Chart 3.

Using 2007 as a starting point and 2014 as a near-term destination, the IMF numbers show that the U.S., Japan, and U.K. will experience “structural” deficit increases of 4-5% of GDP over that period of time, whereas Germany will move in the other direction. Germany, in fact, has just passed a constitutional amendment mandating budget balance by 2016. If these trends persist, the simple conclusion is that interest rates will rise on a relative basis in the U.S., U.K., and Japan compared to Germany over the next several years and that the increase could approximate 100 basis points or more. Some of those increases may already have started to show up – the last few months alone have witnessed 50 basis points of differential between German Bunds and U.S. Treasuries/U.K. Gilts, but there is likely more to come.

The fact is that investors, much like national citizens, need to be vigilant and there has been a decided lack of vigilance in recent years from both camps in the U.S. While we may not have much of a vote between political parties, in the investment world we do have a choice of airlines and some of those national planes may have elevated their bond and other asset markets on the wings of central bank check writing over the past 12 months. Downdrafts and discipline lie ahead for governments and investor portfolios alike. While my own Pollyannish advocacy of “check-free” elections may be quixotic, the shifting of private investment dollars to more fiscally responsible government bond markets may make for a very real outcome in 2010 and beyond. Additionally, if exit strategies proceed as planned, all U.S. and U.K. asset markets may suffer from the absence of the near $2 trillion of government checks written in 2009. It seems no coincidence that stocks, high yield bonds, and other risk assets have thrived since early March, just as this “juice” was being squeezed into financial markets. If so, then most “carry” trades in credit, duration, and currency space may be at risk in the first half of 2010 as the markets readjust to the absence of their “sugar daddy.” There’s no tellin’ where the money went? Not exactly, but it’s left a suspicious trail. Market returns may not be “so fine” in 2010.

William Gross
Managing Director"

You can download Bill Gross' January outlook via .pdf here. So, it seems the focus is now on exit strategies as the Fed *will* have to exit at some point and Gross has shifted to a more cautious approach. This stems from his earlier thoughts on why the market is up so much from the lows. The government has been feeding the markets, and eventually the hand that feeds will disappear.

As we posted on Twitter a while back, "PIMCO's Total Return fund essentially IS the bond market now, $186 billion AUM in Bill Gross' fund now; insane." So, at the very least, it's worth noting his thoughts and what he's up to. We pointed out a while back that Gross was betting on deflation by buying long-term treasuries. Also, we had posted Gross' December outlook as well for those who missed it. Interesting stuff and we'll continue to cover the bond vigilante's thoughts each month.

Why The Stock Market Is Up Over 70% From Its March 2009 Low

The following is a guest post from FirstAdopter.com, a site covering investing and consumer technology news:

-----

There’s a lot of conspiracy theories out there about how the government is manipulating the stock market upwards (I’m looking at you Zero Hedge) by buying stock futures, etc. However a light bulb went off in my head after I read this Time magazine interview with Pimco’s Bill Gross on how simple the explanation is.

But secondly, there’s a ripple affect. Just speaking about Pimco’s general portfolio strategy, we’ve sold our agency mortgage securities, Fannie and Freddie, in the billions to the willing check of the Fed. They’re buying a trillion dollars of them, or have over the past 9-12 months, and so we sold them a lot of ours. Now, what did we do with the money? We bought Treasuries, we bought corporate bonds, and so the bond markets in general have benefited, as have stocks because this available money effectively flows through the capital markets. So it’s a trillion-and-a-half dollar check that won’t be there as the Fed withdraws from the market. How that affects the markets, I just don’t know. I’m not eagerly anticipating the answer, but I think it holds some surprises in 2010, not just in mortgage securities but stocks as well.

So basically Bill Gross, the largest fund manager in the world, explains it to us. The Fed has been buying $1.5 trillion worth of securities from financial firms at unnatural supply/demand and some would say inflated prices, who then use this big pile of money they get from selling to the Fed to buy other stuff like corporate bonds and stocks. This is $1.5 trillion that did not exist before. It is printed money that is flowing through the financial capital markets lifting all boats. A simple explanation for the markets’ rise.

To prove this let’s look at the timing of Fed mortgage backed security buy program announcements. In 2008 the SP500 bottomed on November 21st, 2008. I remember things being very scary then. The Fed then announced their first $500 billion mortgage backed security (MBS) buy program on November 25th, 2008 (Link). The market then rallied 25%+ off the low and topped on January 6th, 2009.

The market then tanked again and bottomed on March 6th, 2009. I remember things being even scarier then. The Fed decided to add $750 billion to the MBS buy program to the original $500 billion and $300 billion of long-term Treasuries for a total over $1.5 trillion of buying power on March 18th, 2009 (Link). In time this $1.5 trillion of printed money worked its way through the system, hence the amazing 70%+ rally.

The lesson is the next time the Fed announces another $500 billion+ capital markets buy program buy the market hand-over-fist, although I doubt this will happen anytime soon given the political climate. And the $1.5 trillion of securities that the Fed bought? Here’s what Bill Gross says about that.

They won’t sell — it’s a near impossibility to unload what they’ve purchased over the past 12 months.

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The above was a guest post from FirstAdopter.com.

PIMCO's Bill Gross: Investment Outlook December 2009

Entitled 'Anything but 0.01%,' here's the latest market commentary from bond vigilante Bill Gross of PIMCO. His December 2009 missive focuses on where to put your money in an environment where re-risking seems to be back in vogue as cash on the sidelines attempts to find positive returns to make up for potential losses a year ago. He seems to draw attention to the fact that the risk of bubbles is also on the rise.

As we posted on Twitter a while back, "PIMCO's Total Return fund essentially IS the bond market now, $186 billion AUM in Bill Gross' fund now; insane." So, at the very least, it's worth noting his thoughts and what he's up to. And we pointed out somewhat recently that Gross is betting on deflation by buying long-term treasuries. We've also covered some of his past commentary as well for those who might have missed it.

Below is PIMCO's market commentary from Bill Gross for the month of December 2009:

"

I'm not so much concerned
about the return on my money
as the return of my money.
- Will Rogers, 1933

Toothpicked, straw-hatted Will Rogers was a journalists’ dream, combining common sense with a sense of humor that could trump any newsman of his day, an era that was characterized more by its hopeless and helpless ennui, than its promise for a better tomorrow. During the Great Depression, just breaking even by stuffing your money in a mattress was considered to be a triumph of conservative investment. Likewise, during the past 18 months there have been similar “Will Rogers” moments. Perhaps remarkably, during the week surrounding the Lehman crisis in September of 2008, yours truly frantically called my wife Sue to empty our two local bank accounts into apparently safer Treasury bills. I was not the only PIMCO professional to do so. Preserving principal as opposed to making it grow was the priority of the day – digging a foxhole instead of charging enemy lines seemed paramount.

My how things have changed! With the global financial system apparently stabilized, returns “on” your money are back in vogue, and conservative investors who perhaps appropriately donned a Will Rogers mask nary a fortmonth ago are suddenly waking up to the opportunity cost of 0% cash versus appreciated assets at renewed double-digit annual rates. That 0% yield is not a joke. Almost all money market accounts – totaling over $4 trillion dollars, shown in Chart 1 – yield close to nothing, so close to nothing that I mistakenly did a double take when reviewing my monthly portfolio statement. “Yield on cash,” read the buried line on page 15 of the report, “.01%.”

Well now, I say to myself, this is very interesting from a number of different angles. If I was hoping to double my money, it would take approximately 6,932 years to get there at that rate! Somehow, that wouldn’t satisfy even Will Rogers, who might be choking on his toothpick or at least eating his straw hat in amazement. Secondly, being a savvy professional investor and all, I knew that money market funds actually earned 20 basis points or so on my money, but in this case were allocating a paltry one basis point to me. The words of the Beatles’ “Taxman” immediately popped into mind: “That’s one for you, nineteen for me – TAXMAN!” Ah yes, but in this case it was the Fed and Wall Street that were passing the collection plate. Whether it was really “God’s work,” as Goldman’s Lloyd Blankfein asserted, I wasn’t quite sure. If there was a “temple” in the vicinity I was thinking that God should be driving the moneychangers out as opposed to inviting them in for a pep talk.

Ah, but this is not a vindictive diatribe, although to me, money changers resemble Mammon more than archangels, and they all make too much money, including PIMCO. My point is to recognize, and to hope that you recognize, that an effective zero percent interest rate, as a price for hiding in a foxhole, is prohibitive. Like the American doughboys near France’s future Maginot line in WWI – slumping day after day in a muddy, rat-infested pit – when the battalion commander finally blew his whistle to charge the enemy lines, it probably was accompanied by some sense of relief; anything, anything but this! Anything but .01%!

Recently, approximately $20 billion a week has been exiting those payless, seemingly godless funds in search of a higher-yielding Nirvana. Yet, as Will Rogers knew, and Lehman Brothers demonstrated to another generation, the pain of the foxhole can immediately transition to the dodging of real bullets on the investment battlefield. Moving out on the risk asset spectrum has worked wonders since March of this year, but it comes with the risk of principal loss – failing to receive the return of your money. When viewed from 30,000 feet, there is even a systemic risk that new asset bubbles are in the formative stages – perhaps because of the .01%. Gold at $1,130 an ounce, global equity markets up 60-70% from their 2009 lows, a cascading dollar now 15% lower against a basket of global currencies just 12 months ago, oil at 80 bucks, mortgage rates at 4% thanks to a $1 trillion dollar credit card from the Fed; the list goes on. The legitimate question of the day is, “Is a 0% funds rate creating the next financial bubble, and if so, will the Fed and other central banks raise rates proactively – even in the face of double-digit unemployment?” As Chicago Fed President Charles Evans said in a recent speech, “This notion is often described as an imperative to ‘lean against a bubble,’ meaning that a central bank should act to lower asset prices that by historical standards seem unusually high.”

Yet even if the Fed and others are becoming sensitized to the dangers of up as opposed to exclusively down asset prices, it would seem that now is not the time to be affirming their bipolarity. Asset price rebounds (aside from the historic highs in gold) have followed even more dramatic slumps. A 60% rise in the stock market does not compensate for a 60% decline. Strangely enough, investors are still out 36% of their money once this down elevator/up elevator example plays out. And the simple analysis is that the private sector has still not taken the baton from government policymakers: There has been no public/private sector handoff. Bank lending is still contracting in the U.S. and weak in most other G-10 countries. Unemployment is still rising and approaching historic (ex-Depression) cyclical peaks.

Raise interest rates with 15 million jobless and 25 million part-time working Americans? All because gold is above $1,100? You must be joking or smoking – something. We will need another 12 months of 4-5% nominal GDP growth before Bernanke and company dare lift their heads out of the 0% foxhole – mini-bubbles or not. Instead, the heavy lifting or the charging of enemy lines in the case of this metaphor will likely be done by other central banks – already in Australia and Norway. In addition, and importantly, China may abandon its dollar peg within six months’ time and with it, its own easy monetary policy that has fostered more significant mini-bubbles of lending and asset appreciation on the Chinese mainland. With renewed upward appreciation of the yuan may come potentially volatile global asset price reactions to the downside – higher Treasury yields, and lower stock prices – which the Fed must surely be leery of before making any upward move, of its own, and before moving on, let me state the obvious, but often forgotten bold-face fact: The Fed is trying to reflate the U.S. economy. The process of reflation involves lowering short-term rates to such a painful level that investors are forced or enticed to term out their short-term cash into higher-risk bonds or stocks. Once your cash has recapitalized and revitalized corporate America and homeowners, well, then the Fed will start to be concerned about inflation – not until. To date that transition is incomplete, mainly because mortgage refinancing and the purchase of new homes is being thwarted by significant changes in down payment requirements. The Treasury as well, has a significant average life extension of its own debt to foist on investors before the Fed can raise short-term Fed Funds.

OK, so where does that leave you, the individual investor, the small saver who is paying the price of the .01%? Damned if you do, damned if you don’t. Do you buy the investment grade bond market with its average yield of 3.75% (less than 3% after upfront fees and annual expenses at most run-of-the-mill bond funds)? Do you buy high yield bonds at 8% and assume the risk of default bullets whizzing at you? Or 2% yielding stocks that have already appreciated 65% from the recent bottom, which according to some estimates are now well above their long-term PE average on a cyclically adjusted basis? Two suggestions. First, as emphasized in prior Investment Outlooks, the New Normal is likely to be a significantly lower-returning world. Diminished growth, deleveraging, and increased government involvement will temper profits and their eventual distribution to investors in the form of dividends and interest. As banks, auto companies and other corporate models become more regulated and therefore more like utilities and less like Boardwalk and Park Place, they will return less.

Which brings up the second point. If companies are going to move toward a utility model, why suffer the transformational revaluation risk of equities with such a low 2% dividend return? Granted, Warren Buffet went all-in with the Burlington Northern, but in doing so he admitted it was a 100-year bet with a modest potential return. Still, Warren had to do something with his money; the .01% was eating a hole in his pocket too. Let me tell you what I’m doing. I don’t have the long-term investment objectives of Berkshire Hathaway, so I’m sort of closer to an average investor in that regard. If that’s the case, I figure, why not just buy utilities if that’s what the future American capitalistic model is likely to resemble. Pricewise, they’re only halfway between their 2007 peaks and 2008 lows – 25% off the top, 25% from the bottom. Their growth in earnings should mimic the U.S. economy as they always have, and most importantly they yield 5-6% not .01%! In a low growth environment, it seems to me that a company’s stock should yield more than its less risky debt, and many utilities provide just that opportunity. Utilities and even quasi-utility telecommunication companies now yield between 5 and 6%, whereas their 10- and 30-year bond yield less and at a higher tax rate to you the investor.

So come on you frustrated Will Rogers lookalikes. Join the wimp who pulled his money out of the bank just 14 months ago. Look at your monthly statement, zero in on that .01% yield and say to yourself, “I’m as mad as hell, and I’m just not going to take this anymore!” You can’t buy the Burlington Northern – Warren Buffett has scooped that up – and most other choices offer tempting returns, but potential bullets as well. Buy some utilities. It may not be as much fun as running a railroad, but at least you’ll know who to call if the lights go out.

William H. Gross
Managing Director"

You can also download the commentary in .pdf form here.

PIMCO's Bill Gross: Investment Outlook (October 2009)

Here's the latest from Mr. Bond a.k.a. Bill Gross of PIMCO. His October market commentary is interestingly enough entitled, 'Doo-Doo Economics.' We recently learned that Gross was swapping out of corporates and buying long-term treasuries. He now leans toward the deflation side, at least for now, in the ongoing debate of inflation versus deflation. We have also previously posted up his September commentary and his insight shifts this month to the ongoing problems in California and you can read the latest edition of his Investment Outlook commentary below, courtesy of PIMCO:

"

The world is turning “green” – global warming or not. Electric cars, free-range chickens, and White House vegetable gardens are the wave of the future, but the defining badge of environmentalists may be none of those and might, in fact, be colored blue, as opposed to green. Dog owners would be the first to acknowledge it. Having converted reluctantly to felines nearly ten years ago, I myself am only forced to humble myself by emptying the litter box once or twice a year when Sue is visiting the relatives. But dogs? Well, Bowser has to be walked, and Bowser owners these days are being forced to subserviently follow in step, holding those little blue “doo-doo” bags at the ready that keep the neighbors’ grass green instead of brown and minimize the number of summer flies to a billion per square mile. No longer will the current generation be allowed to use pooper-scoopers; they must in fact be pooper “stoopers,” bending down, turning the bag inside out to form a glove, and then – EEECH – making the grass environmentally friendly again by picking it up, reversing the bag and hurriedly looking for the nearest neighbor’s garbage can who might conveniently be at church or shopping at the grocery store. One can only hope that Fido is mildly constipated, if you get my drift. I can recall the diaper days with my three kids. It wasn’t a pleasant experience, but those non-environmentally friendly Pampers at least afforded one-stop dropping – easy on, easy off – no touchy, no feely. In those days, a doggie bag was something you asked for in a fine restaurant to take home the steak bones. Now it’s a blue plastic reminder that the world is changing and in many respects our daily routine is becoming a dog’s life.

A similar metaphor could be applied to the 45 million citizens of the State of California. Once “golden” and the land of entrepreneurial opportunity, the state has turned from filet mignon to ground chuck and its residents are now on a short leash as opposed to masters of their own universe. Unemployment at 12.2% is near the nation’s highest and its Baa bond rating is the country’s lowest. Its schools are abysmal, competing with Louisiana and Mississippi for the lowest rating in the federal government’s National Assessment of Educational Progress. While the air is much cleaner than it was 20 years ago, the freeways are stereotypically jammed and increasingly less free – the age of the toll road serving the exasperated (or simply the Mercedes owners) is upon us.

Our canine existence has many fathers. Perhaps more than any other state, California has been affected by its perverted form of government, requiring a two-thirds vote by state legislators to effectively pass a budget. In addition, the state’s laws are almost tragically shaped by a form of direct democracy more resemblant of the Jacksonian era, where the White House furniture was constantly at risk due to unruly citizens, high on whisky, and low on morals and common sense. Propositions from conservatives and liberals alike have locked up much of the budget, with Proposition 13 in 1978 reducing property taxes by 57% and Prop. 98 in 1988 requiring 40% of the general fund to be spent on schools. Recently, much of any excess has been gobbled not only by teachers, but unbelievably by a prison lobby that would be the envy of any on Washington’s K Street.

The result has been a $26 billion deficit that was supposedly “closed” in recent weeks, but which largely was a “kick the can” accounting scheme that postponed the pain, or better yet, pled for a federal solution to self-inflicted wounds. State budgets of course are required to be balanced each year, but that has long been a fiction throughout most of the country. Still, California’s 2009 fix was perhaps the longest kick of the can in history, refusing effectively to raise taxes, superficially cutting expenses, and shaming its fading image by refusing to disburse required billions to local counties and communities, as well as using accounting tricks that couldn’t fool a grade-schooler. In the process, they managed to reinvent the IOU, paying bills in virtual scrip that then traded at substantial discounts on eBay of all places. They have issued tax anticipation notes of all sorts with a multitude of lettered configurations that anagram aficionados would revel in. Just last week the state extended its begging bowl for $8 billion of “RANs” (Revenue Anticipation Notes) at an onerous money market rate of 1 1⁄2%. Previously they had issued “RAWs” (Revenue Anticipation Warrants). “BAGs” might be next – blue BAGS, that is, full of the doo-doo that California citizens have grown used to picking up.

There are signs that California voters are ready to make some tough choices, having recently refused to pass five propositions that would have extended tax hikes and failed to address spending. Whether or not Governor Schwarzenegger and legislators will agree to a constitutional convention to address the poisonous proposition plebiscite itself is a larger question that will likely be affirmatively answered only if the state economy continues to remain in the tank, which it likely will. But California’s problems, while somewhat unique and self-inflicted, are really America’s problems, and not just because the California economy is 15% of national GDP. While California’s $26 billion deficit is not directly comparable to the federal gap of $1 trillion-plus, they both reflect a lack of discipline and indeed vision to perceive that the strong growth in revenues was driven by the same excess leverage and the same delusionary asset appreciation that was bound to approach cliff’s edge. California’s property taxes, income taxes, and sales taxes were all artificially elevated by national and indeed global imbalances as the U.S. manufactured paper, and Asia manufactured things in mercantilistic exchange. Total tax revenues have actually fallen 14% over the past 12 months in California and substantially more in other states. At some point, that Fantasyland merry-go-round had to stop and whether the defining moment was marked by Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, or the tumultuous week that followed in September of 2008 is really not the point.

What is critical to recognize is that both California and the U.S., as well as numerous global lookalikes such as the U.K., Spain, and Eastern European invalids, are in a poor position to compete in a global economy where capitalism is morphing from its decades-long emphasis on finance and levered risk taking to a more conservative, regulated, production-oriented system advantaged by countries focusing on thrift and deferred gratification. The term “capitalism” itself speaks to “capital” – the accumulation of it and the eventual efficient employment of it – for growth in profits and real wages alike.

What California once had and is losing rapidly is its “capital”: unquestionably in its ongoing double-digit billion dollar deficits, but also in its crown jewel educational system that led to Silicon Valley miracles such as Hewlett Packard, Apple, Google, and countless other new age innovators. In addition, its human capital is beginning to exit as more people move out of the state than in. While the United States as a whole has yet to suffer that emigration indignity, the same cannot be said for foreign-born and U.S.-educated scientists and engineers who now choose to return to their homelands to seek opportunity. Lady Liberty’s extended hand offering sanctuary to other nations’ “tired, poor and huddled masses” may be limited to just that. The invigorated wind up elsewhere.

Now that our financial system has been stabilized, one wonders whether California’s “Governator” and indeed the Obama Administration has the capital, the vision, and indeed the discipline of its citizenry to turn things around. Our future doggie bags can hold steak bones or doo-doo of an increasingly familiar smell. For now investors should be holding their noses, their risk orientation, as well as their blue bags, until proven otherwise. Specifically that continues to dictate a focus on high quality bonds and steady dividend paying stocks that can survive, if not thrive, in our journey to a “new normal” economy of slower growth, muted profit gains, and potential capital destruction via default, abrogation of property rights, and dollar devaluation.

William H. Gross
Managing Director

"

For thoughts from Bill more-so related to the markets, check out our latest post on him that details how he's betting on deflation.

PIMCO's Bill Gross Bets On Deflation

Bond manager Bill Gross of PIMCO clearly feels deflation is still a threat. His actions speak louder than any words he might speak given that he has been buying long-term treasuries over the past few weeks. Gross now has 44% of his Total Return Fund's assets in government related bonds, which is the most since August 2004. Back only 3 months ago, Gross had only 25% of the fund in these assets. In doing so, PIMCO and Gross sold some of their mortgage debt.

This is a notable shift because Gross plowed the Total Return Fund's assets into corporate debt earlier in the year as he liked buying debt of companies that had deals with the government as he felt security there. While one could speculate that maybe Gross was just 'taking profits' in corporates as the easy money there has already been made, the force of his move into long term bonds speaks volumes and stamps down an emphatic deflationary viewpoint. Gross feels that there will be a flattening of the yield curve due to deleveraging, deglobalization, and regulation. Such a move in yields would constitute short-term rates rising while long-term rates fall. And as the name implies, this is the complete opposite of curve steepening. In the past, we've covered how numerous hedge funds have had a stark difference of opinion by putting curve steepener trades on. In particular, we just last week focused on hedge fund legend Julian Robertson's curve caps play. So, it's interesting to see the 'battle' here between deflation and inflation, and respectively Gross and Robertson.

In Bill Gross' September commentary, he draws a few conclusions upon which he can focus his strategy around. PIMCO essentially feels that global interest rates will remain low for an extended period of time while markets and economies recover. Drawing on that point, they think that the duration and extent of quantitative easing as well as stimulation efforts will be a crucial factor in determining investment returns. PIMCO likes to 'play on the government's team' in this regard as they favor exploring investments that will benefit or remain secure from government policies. They also think that the dollar will suffer over a longer timeline. Gross is counting on long-term rates coming down as assets are substituted for cash on the sidelines. Basically, he is betting that institutions will look to sell some reflated assets and use cash to take care of debt or refinancing. So, definitely interesting conclusions and you can read the rest of PIMCO's thoughts here. The main thing to take away though is the fact that Gross has a deflationary viewpoint and sees an emphasis being placed on delevering, deglobalization, and regulation.

For more from PIMCO and Bill Gross, you can read his September commentary here and his August commentary here. And for the other side of the argument, make sure you check out our piece on Julian Robertson's inflationary wager. The deflation versus inflation debate continues as more and more warriors enter the ring, placing their bets on the outcome. It certainly will be interesting to see who wins because there are always two sides to a trade. However, the intriguing thing here is that both sides could technically win if the participants are patient through the gyrations in their respective positions and choose ideal exit points as rates and the markets continue to shift. At this stage of the game, anything's possible in these crazy times.

Bill Gross September 2009 Commentary (PIMCO)

Here's the latest commentary from PIMCO's bond boss, Bill Gross. He entitles it, "On the 'course' to a new normal." In addition to the text below, you can also download it in .pdf version here.

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From PIMCO:

Analyzing why people play golf is like exploring the intricacies of string theory – there are so many permutations lacking scientific observation that physicists or golfers can pretty darn well say anything they like and the explanation might stick. When it comes to whacking that little white ball, the possibilities are nearly endless: People play to relax, to be with friends, to get close to Mother Nature, to enhance business connections, to compete and excel. Gosh, I don’t know, the Zen explanation for why we play golf could even resemble the old saw about climbing a mountain: People golf because it’s there. Whatever the reason, it is the most frustrating, damnable game ever conceived – alternately elevating and depressing you within the span of mere minutes. I love golf. No, I hate it.

Personally, the reason that golf draws me to its intricate web of psychological entrapment is epitomized by a simple six-inch trophy: a chartreuse ball resting on top of its ebony base, preening on a bookshelf in the family room at our desert home. Its inscription reads, “Hole in one, March 15^th, 1990, 14^th hole Desert Course, 155 yards.” Well and good, I suppose – the ace of my life – except it wasn’t. It was the ace of my wife. Above the inscription rests the name Sue – not Bill – Gross. It was a great shot but it wasn’t my shot, and I guess therein lies the explanation for why I continue to tee it up.

Actually, two years ago I did tee it up in the sweltering 105° June heat of the Palm Springs desert. No one, of course, was crazy enough to be with me including my “ace” role model wife who was sipping a cool lemonade in the comfort of our air-conditioned home. Now, there is an “unwritten” rule in golf that in order to be official, a hole-in-one has to be witnessed, and that you have to play a full 18 holes. Otherwise, I suppose, you could stand on the tee with a bucket of balls and hit hundreds or thousands until one of the little guys went in – whatever. The fact is, on this particular day, I was playing only one ball, but I was alone, and – good God! – it went in! The trophy with ebony base and spanking white Titleist ball would read: “Hole in one, June 7^th, 2007, 17^th hole, Mountain Course, 139 yards.” Or was it? Does a falling tree make a sound in the middle of a forest if no one’s there? Is a hole-in-one a hole-in-one if no one else saw it? I say emphatically – yes! That damn ball went in and later that day Sue agreed with me (although she had a funny look in her eye – especially since she didn’t know a thing about the rules of golf). No one else though. No one else agrees with me. Not a soul. I suspect they’re jealous and, in fact, I’ve seen a few of them hitting buckets of balls at dusk from that very same tee when they think nobody’s looking. I’m watching, though, which brings up a funny question. If they sunk one, would theirs be a hole-in-one because I was a witness? Like I said – a damnable game.

“Is a hole-in-one a hole-in-one” may not strike you as the most critical question of the hour, and I would readily agree. “Will we have a New Normal global economy (and investment market)?” would probably usurp it on even Tiger Woods’s top ten list. This “new” vs. “old” normal dichotomy was perhaps best contrasted by Barton Biggs, as I heard him on Bloomberg Radio in early 2009, when he said he was a “child of the bull market.” I thought that was a brilliant phrase, and Barton is a brilliant phrase-maker. He went on to say though, that his point was that for as long as he’s been in the business – and that’s a long time – it has paid to buy the dips, because markets, economies, profits, and assets always rebounded and went to higher levels. That is not only the way that he learned it, but that is the way, basically, that capitalism is supposed to work. Economies grow, profits grow, just like children do. I think that’s why he said he was a child of the bull market, not just because he had experienced it for so long, but also because economic growth and higher asset prices are almost invariably a natural evolution, much like the maturation of a person. That’s how people grow, and so I think Barton was saying that capitalism just grows that way too.

Well, the surprise is that there’s been a significant break in that growth pattern, because of delevering, deglobalization, and reregulation. All of those three in combination, to us at PIMCO, means that if you are a child of the bull market, it’s time to grow up and become a chastened adult; it’s time to recognize that things have changed and that they will continue to change for the next – yes, the next 10 years and maybe even the next 20 years. We are heading into what we call the New Normal, which is a period of time in which economies grow very slowly as opposed to growing like weeds, the way children do; in which profits are relatively static; in which the government plays a significant role in terms of deficits and reregulation and control of the economy; in which the consumer stops shopping until he drops and begins, as they do in Japan (to be a little ghoulish), starts saving to the grave.

This focus on the DDRs – delevering, deglobalization, and reregulation – may be conceptually understandable, but nevertheless still a little hard to get one’s arms around. Why would they necessarily lead to a new, slower growth normal? A little easier to grasp might be the following approach, which feeds off the same concept, but which extends it a little further by suggesting that DD and R lead to a number of broken business or economic models that may forever change the world we once knew and make even Barton Biggs a chastened adult. They are as follows:

1. American-style capitalism and the making of paper instead of things. Inherent in the “great moderation” of the past 25 years was the acceptance of a sort of reverse mercantilism. America would consume, then print paper assets and debt in order to pay for it. Developing (and many developed) countries would make things, and accept America’s securities in return. This game is over, and unless developing countries (China, Brazil) step up and generate a consumer ethic of their own, the world will grow at a slower pace.
   
2. Private vs. public-driven growth. The invisible hand of free enterprise is being replaced by the visible fist of government, a temporarily necessary, but (if permanent) damnable condition itself in terms of future growth and profits. The once successful “shadow banking system” is being regulated and delevered. Perhaps a fabled “110-pound weakling” may be an exaggeration of where our financial system is headed, but rest assured it will not be looking like Charles Atlas anytime soon. Prepare to have sand kicked in your face, if you believe you are a “child of the bull market!”
   
3. Global economic leadership. It’s premature to award the 21st century to the Chinese as opposed to the United States, but if the last six months have been any example, China is sort of lookin’ like Muhammad Ali standing over Sonny Liston in 1964 yelling, “Get up, you big ugly bear!” Not only has China spent three times the amount of money (relative to GDP) to revive its economy, but it has managed to grow at a “near normal” 8% pace vs. our “big R” recessionary numbers. Its equity market, while volatile and lightly regulated, has almost doubled in twelve months, making ours look like that ugly bear instead of a raging bull.
   
4. United States housing and employment. Old normal housing models in the U.S. encouraged home ownership, eventually peaking at 69% of households as shown in Chart 1. Subsidized and tax-deductible mortgage interest rates as well as a “see no evil – speak no evil” regulatory response to government Agencies FNMA and FHLMC promoted a long-term housing boom and now a significant housing bust. Housing cannot lead us out of this big R recession no matter what the recent Case-Shiller home price numbers may suggest. The model has been broken if only because homeownership is declining, not rising, sinking to perhaps a New Normal level of 65% as opposed to 69% of American households.
   
   Similarly, the financialization of assets via the shadow banking system led to an American era of consumerism because debt was available, interest rates were low, and the livin’ became easy. Savings rates plunged from 10% to -1%, as many (if not most) assumed there was no reason to save – the second mortgage would pay for everything. Now things have perhaps irreversibly changed. Savings rates are headed up, consumer spending growth rates moving down. Get ready for the New Normal.

I could go on, reintroducing the negatives of an aging boomer society not just in the U.S., but worldwide. Increased health care may be GDP positive, but it’s only a plus from a “broken window” point of view. Far better to have a younger, healthier society than to spend trillions fixing up an aging, increasingly overweight and diabetic one. Same thing goes for energy. Far easier and more profitable to pump oil out of the Yates Field in Texas or even Prudhoe Bay than to spend trillions on a new “green” society. Our world, and the world’s world, is changing significantly, leading to slower growth accompanied by a redefined public/private partnership.

The investment implications of this New Normal evolution cannot easily be modeled econometrically, quantitatively, or statistically. The applicable word in New Normal is, of course, “new.” The successful investor during this transition will be one with common sense and importantly the powers of intuition, observation, and the willingness to accept uncertain outcomes. As of now, PIMCO observes that the highest probabilities favor the following strategic conclusions:

1. Global policy rates will remain low for extended periods of time.
2. The extent and duration of quantitative easing, term financing and fiscal stimulation efforts are keys to future investment returns across a multitude of asset categories, both domestically and globally.
3. Investors should continue to anticipate and, if necessary, shake hands with government policies, utilizing leverage and/or guarantees to their benefit.
4. Asia and Asian-connected economies (Australia, Brazil) will dominate future global growth.
5. The dollar is vulnerable on a long-term basis.

Like playing in an Open Championship, future golfers/investors need to play conservatively and avoid critical mistakes. An “even par” scorecard (plus some hard earned alpha) may be enough to hoist the trophy in a New Normal world. Holes-in-one? Maybe if you’re lucky. But make sure someone’s watching, and that their eyes are focused on the New Normal. As for golf, even Sue, my only supporter, has asked me to move my ball, on its own ebony base, away from her more authentic and perhaps the still solitary ace made by Gross family golfers. What a damnable condition.

William H. Gross
Managing Director

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Make sure to also check out Bill Gross' August commentary as well if you're interested.

PIMCO's Bill Gross Investment Outlook: August 2009

Some of you may have already read the latest from PIMCO's Bill Gross. But if you haven't, then here's the August 2009 commentary from the bond-trooper himself, entitled 'Investment Potions,' which can be found on PIMCO's website.


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I took my troubles down to Madame Rue
You know that gypsy with the gold-capped tooth
She’s got a pad down on 34th and Vine
Sellin’ little bottles of – Love Potion #9
– Love Potion #9, Circa 1959

I’ve never known any gold-capped tooth money managers, but without squinting very hard there is undoubtedly a strong resemblance between all of us “managers” and the infamous Madame Rue selling Potion #9. Instead of love, though, we sell “hope,” but very few are able to seal the deal with performance anywhere close to compensating for the generous fees we command. Hope has a legitimate price, of course, even if its promises are never fulfilled. It is the reason we put a five spot into the collection plate on Sunday mornings and why we risk a 25-dollar chip at the blackjack table. In the former case we usually rationalize it as “insurance,” and with the latter as “entertainment.” Whatever – I’ve already alienated all of you with strong faith in the hereafter or the ones who actually believe they’re going to win on their next trip to Las Vegas. But my point is that those who sell investment “potions” must wrap their product with an extra large ribbon because history is not on their side. Common sense would dictate that the industry as a whole cannot outperform the market because they are the market, and long-term statistics revealing negative alpha for the class of active managers confirms it. Yet, what a price investors are willing to pay! A recent Barron’s article pointed out that stock funds extract an average 99 basis points or virtually 1% a year in fees from an investor’s portfolio. Bond managers are more benevolent (or less pretentious) at 75 basis points, and many money market funds manage to subsist at a miserly 38. Still, those 38 basis points are as deceptive as the pea that disappears beneath the shell of a street-side con game. Since money market funds barely earn 38 basis points these days, much of the return winds up in the hands of investment managers. A mighty expensive potion indeed. While some index and ETF proponents avoid this extreme absurdity with lower fees, roughly 90% of the $1.5 trillion in 401(k) and other defined contribution assets in mutual funds are in actively managed offerings with expenses close to 1%. Paying for those potions during an era of asset appreciation with double-digit returns may have been tolerable, but if investment returns gravitate close to 6% as envisaged in PIMCO’s “new normal,” then 15% of your income will be extracted based on the beguiling promise of Madame Rue. The solution, of course, is to compare long-term performance with fees and approach 34th & Vine with informed confidence, as opposed to Pollyannaish hope that you’ll get your money’s worth. Down the hatch and good luck!

Investors looking for love potions or successful investment strategies in this new normal economy dominated by deleveraging and reregulation must focus on some very macro-oriented ingredients as opposed to typical news-dominated minutiae. The latest quarterly earnings report from Goldman Sachs may be an indicator that the financial sector is getting some color in its cheeks, but it doesn’t really let you know what needs to happen in order for the real economy to stabilize as well. My last month’s Investment Outlook commentary on the significance of wage and employment trends remains the key focus. Common sense tells us that consumer spending growth comes from highly employed, well-compensated labor, and we are far-far from even approaching that elemental condition. The fact is that near double-digit unemployment has resulted from numerous business models that are now broken: autos, home construction, commercial real estate development, finance, and retail sales. Construction of a new Humpty Dumpty capitalistic “oeuf” will be a herculean task.

Potion hunters, however, should also understand the following macro concept that will dominate the indefinite future, one which I will humbly try to explain in the next few pages in 500 words or less: Reflating nominal GDP by inflating asset prices is the fundamental, yet infrequently acknowledged, goal of policymakers. If they can do that, then employment and economic stability may ultimately follow.

To explain:
A country’s GDP or Gross Domestic Product is really just an annual total of the goods and services that have been produced by its existing stock of investment (capital in the form of plant, equipment, software and certain intangibles) and labor (people working). Over the last 15 years or so in the U.S. that annual production (GDP) has increased in nominal (real growth and inflation) terms of 5-7% as shown in Chart 1. Not every year, certainly not in boom or recessionary years, but pretty steadily over longer timeframes, and consistently enough to signal to capitalists that 5% was the number they could count on to justify employment hiring, investment spending plans, and which would serve as well as a close proxy for the return on capital that they should expect. Nominal GDP is in fact a decent proxy for a national economy’s return on capital. If each and every year we grew by 5%, then that would be sort of like a stock whose earnings grew by the same amount. Companies and investors then would be able to estimate the present value of those cash flows, and price investment and related assets accordingly – a capital asset pricing model or CAPM based on nominal GDP expectations.

While objectively hard to prove, logic dictates that that is exactly what has happened over the past several decades. Businesses expanded with a developing certainty that demand, expenses, and return on the economy’s capital would mimic this 5% consistency. Debt was issued with yields that reflected the ability to service those payments through 5% growth in both real and inflationary terms, and stocks were issued and priced as well with the same foundation. Pension obligations and similar liabilities were legitimized on comparable logic, as were government spending programs forecasting tax revenues and benefits. Both real economy and financial markets then, were geared to and, in fact, mesmerized by this 5%, GDP/CAPM, “model.”

Now, however, things have changed, and it is apparent that there is massive overcapacity in the U.S. and indeed the global economy. As reflexive delevering has unveiled the ugly stepsister of the “great 5% moderation,” nominal GDP has not only sunk below 5%, but turned at least temporarily negative. If allowed to continue – and this is my critical point – a portion of the U.S. production capacity and labor market will have to be permanently laid off. Nominal GDP has to grow close to 5% in order for the economy’s long-term balance to be maintained. Otherwise, employment levels become unsustainable, retail shopping centers unserviceable, automobile production facilities unprofitable, and the economy itself heads towards a new normal where unemployment averages 8 instead of 5%, housing starts total 1.5 instead of 2 million, and domestic auto sales 12, instead of 16 million annual units. Critically in the readjustment process, debts are haircutted via corporate defaults and home foreclosures, and equity P/Es are cut based upon increased risk and substantially lower growth expectations. A virtuous circle of expansion turns into a vicious cycle of recession or low-growth stagnation. Label it what you will, but a modern capitalistic economy based on levered financing and asset appreciation cannot thrive if its “return on capital” or nominal GDP suffers such a significant shock.

Policymakers/government to the rescue –we hope. 0% interest rates, quantitative easing, $1.5 trillion deficits, trillions more in FDIC or explicit government guarantees, a trillion plus in MBS and Treasury bond purchases, TALF, TARP – I could, but I need not go on. Can they do it? In other words, can they successfully reflate to 5% nominal GDP and recreate an “old” normal economy? Not likely. The substitution of government-backed vs. private-leverage is one strong argument against the possibility. Despite the attractive financing rates incorporated with the TALF, TLGP and other government-subsidized financing programs, they come with quality constraints (larger collateral haircuts and mortgage down payments, to name a few) that inhibit the “new normal” lenders from approaching the standards of the 5% nominal-based shadow banking system. Just last week, President Obama proposed new “transaction fees” for “far out transactions” undertaken by financial companies. “If you guys want to do them,” he said, “put something into the kitty.” In turn, there are internal Washington Beltway/external Main Street USA, politically imposed limits which will thwart policy expansion beyond the current stasis. Most of the politicos and even ordinary citizens are screaming for limits on monetary/fiscal expansion: “No TARP II! 1.5 trillion dollar deficits are enough! The Fed must have an exit plan!” etc. If there are such future political constraints or caps (both domestically and from abroad), then one should recognize that most of the ammunition has been spent stabilizing the financial system, and very little directed towards the real economy in terms of job loss prevention. Where is the political will or wallet now to grant corporate tax breaks for private sector job creation or to even hire new government workers, aside from a minor positive push with military enlistment? In brief, the “new normal” nominal GDP, the future return on our stock of labor and capital investment, will likely be centered closer to 3%, for at least a few years once a recovery is in place beginning in this year’s second half. Diminished capitalistic risk taking and constrained policymaker releveraging will lead to that likely conclusion.

Investment conclusions? A 3% nominal GDP “new normal” means lower profit growth, permanently higher unemployment, capped consumer spending growth rates and an increasing involvement of the government sector, which substantially changes the character of the American capitalistic model. High risk bonds, commercial real estate, and even lower quality municipal bonds may suffer more than cyclical defaults if not government supported. Stock P/Es will rest at lower historical norms, and higher stock prices will ultimately depend on tangible earnings growth in the form of increased dividends, not green shoots hope. An investor should remember that a journey to 3% nominal GDP means default/haircuts for assets on the upper end of the risk spectrum, as well as extremely low yielding returns for government and government-guaranteed assets at the bottom end. There is no investment potion for this new environment other than steady income-producing bond and equity investments in companies with strong balance sheets and high dividend yields, as well as selectively chosen emerging market commitments where nominal GDP growth prospects are tilted upward as opposed to gravitating to new lower norms. Madame Rue has met her match.

William H. Gross
Managing Director

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Alternatively, you can try downloading the .pdf here while the link lasts. And if you missed his July Investment Outlook, we touched on that in one of our recent hedge fund/market guru news summaries.